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Tag Archives: US-Turkey Relations
It’s time for the US to stop alienating its allies
This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on May 6, 2017.
Turkey’s air strikes on PKK-affiliated groups in Iraq and Syria should be a wake-up call for the Trump administration.
Turkey’s April 25 air strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Iraq and its affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria were unexpected, but should not have surprised anyone.
Turkey has consistently maintained that the PKK’s presence in Iraq’s Sinjar region was unacceptable. Only two months into the Euphrates Shield Operation back in October 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged that Turkey would not tolerate Sinjar to be the “new Qandil”, referring to the terror group’s base of operations in northern Iraq.
While Turkish officials repeated their opposition to PKK’s presence in Sinjar several times, officials from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) also asked the PKK to leave the area.
Early in March 2017, clashes broke out between the PKK-linked Yazidi militia and the KRG’s Peshmerga fighters, a sign of increased tensions among Kurdish groups fuelled by the PKK’s lingering presence in the region.
Qandil mountains are located along the Iraq-Iran border in northeastern Iraq. The PKK have long been taking advantage of the mountainous terrain and using its bases there to train, plan attacks, and provide logistical support to its fighters. A similar base in Sinjar would help the PKK to operate in northwestern Iraq – an area near the Syrian border which is critically important for the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). US military planners must be betting on the promises of the PKK-linked Sinjar Resistance Units to help cut off ISIL’s route between Mosul and Raqqa.
A strain on US-Turkey relations
Turkey is opposed to not only PKK’s influence in the region, but also the US’ apparent tactical decision to utilise the PKK against ISIL. Turkey prefers a combination of Peshmerga forces and Free Syrian Army fighters to take the lead in the fight against ISIL, as these groups pose no threat to Turkey’s national security.
The PKK, on the other hand, has not only continued to conduct attacks against Turkey but has also sought to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria through its Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party, by making deals with prominent actors in Syria’s war, including Russia.
Creating a hub and a base for its operations in Sinjar is critical for the PKK, but actualisation of this plan would ironically violate the Iraqi-Syrian border – just like ISIL attempted to do in the past.
US military leaders seem to consider the PKK affiliates in Iraq and Syria as allies in the fight against ISIL.
The US Central Command went even further than that and is now reportedly patrolling the Syrian-Turkish border to discourage escalation and violence between two of its “most trusted partners in the fight to defeat ISIL”.
The US military did not hide its displeasure with the Turkish air strikes against the PKK and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria despite the fact that the US and Turkey are supposed to be part of the same anti-ISIS coalition. At the same time, neither President Trump, nor US officials at the cabinet level, have made any statements against Turkish operations.
The forthcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and his Turkish counterpart will surely involve extensive discussions around the US-Turkey strategic disconnect in the fight against ISIL and the PKK’s influence on the ground. It will be a challenge, however, to resolve this issue in one meeting.
Two sides will need to talk more often and in-depth about a military plan to root out ISIL but also, and more importantly, they will need to agree on a political plan that would establish stability on the ground in a post-ISIL scenario. Unfortunately, the anti-ISIL coalition’s efforts have been largely tactical and created space for non-state actors such as the PKK to take advantage of a security vacuum spanning Iraq and Syria.
There are signs that the Trump administration may be working on a more thoughtful approach that prioritises long-term strategies over short-term tactical gains.
It is not clear, however, if this new approach will translate into actual policy. So far, the White House has not made a political decision on whether to arm the YPG directly and include them in operations to liberate Raqqa from ISIL. Turkey has presented multiple proposals that exclude the YPG from the Raqqa operation and replace them with local Arab forces supported by Turkish troops.
Any scenario that empowers and legitimises PKK’s affiliates will certainly strain US-Turkey relations and risk weakening anti-ISIL operations. It is clear as a result of the April 25 operations that Turkey is determined to limit the reach and influence of the PKK and its affiliates on national security grounds. Beyond Turkey’s own national security requirements, it is difficult to see how allowing the PKK to control Arab-majority towns and to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria contributes to long-term stability.
The Trump administration needs to go beyond tactical wins and take its time to create a more careful strategy both to avoid alienating key allies, such as Turkey, and to conduct a sustainable anti-ISIL campaign.
Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington, DC.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
The Search for an American Foreign Policy and US-Turkey Relations in the Trump Era
This article was coauthored by Kadir Ustun and Kilic Kanat and was published by Orient on March 31, 2017.
The US must heed Turkish concerns in Syria
This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on March 15, 2017.
If the US insists on supporting the YPG against Turkey’s wishes, Syria’s post-ISIL stability is going to be in peril.
United States Senator John McCain has it right that the US has underestimated and, at times, disregarded Turkey’s concern over its support for the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. The US’ rationale for helping the YPG was predicated on a flawed anti-ISIL strategy that shied away from a comprehensive approach.
Turkish discomfort with the US support for the YPG is not based on an opposition against Syrian Kurds. Despite their efforts to promote themselves as the representatives of Syrian Kurds, the YPG poses a direct national security threat to Turkey.
The group is the Syrian arm of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – designated by Turkey, the US, and the European Union as a terrorist organisation – which has been fighting the Turkish government since 1984.
The two groups’ close ties have previously been acknowledged by US officials including the former US Defense Secretary Ash Carter in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.
The YPG draws much of its tactical and strategic direction as well as resources from the PKK and arms given to the YPG directly threaten Turkey, as they can be passed onto PKK fighters inside Turkey.
In other words, continued US support for the YPG lends legitimacy to the Syrian extension of a terror organisation threatening a NATO ally.
‘A misguided policy’
The US appears set to move forward with arming and supporting the PKK-linked YPG in preparation for the Raqqa operation.
This is not only the continuation of a misguided policy left over from the Obama administration, but it also risks irreparable damage to US’ relations with Turkey, a critical ally in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS).
Turkey has been quite hopeful about a potential change in Syria policy under the Trump administration, but all indications are that the new US administration’s Syria policy is also dominated by the fight against ISIL.
Under Donald Trump, the Pentagon is focused on achieving a victory against ISIL by working with “local partners” and limiting American “boots on the ground”. which is a continuation of the Obama administration’s strategy.
This approach disregards Turkey’s concerns and spells instability and unpredictability after dislodging ISIL from Raqqa and northern Syria.
The Obama administration invested in developing relations with the PKK-linked YPG fighters in Syria under the pretext that they were the only effective fighting force on the ground to fight ISIL.
This view ignored the political ambitions of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the political umbrella organisation of the Syrian Kurds, to create a de facto autonomous region in northern Syria and, perhaps inadvertently, emboldened the PKK against Turkey, as it sought international support and legitimacy.
It also failed to acknowledge the demographic engineering efforts or the human rights abuses of the PYD that sought to push out Arab populations from northern Syria.
While the YPG promoted itself as the only reliable, secular, effective fighting force in the region, the US chose to ignore that the YPG focused on establishing and consolidating their control in the region at the expense of Syrian Arabs and even other Kurdish groups.
Trump’s strategy
The Obama administration was following an “Iraq first” strategy in their efforts to defeat ISIL by subcontracting the fight against the armed group to YPG in northern Syria.
But the Trump administration wants to achieve speedy results through bold action, so there are signs that the US’ fight against ISIL might proceed on both fronts – in Iraq and Syria – in the near future.
This makes sense given that as a result of Obama administration’s reluctance to be involved in Syria, ISIL has had a lot of resources and breathing room in this country.
However, if not enough thought is given to post-ISIL stabilisation efforts in Raqqa and the rest of northern Syria, the military defeat of ISIL might be followed by instability and potential conflict between Turkey and the YPG.
Turkey has warned the US against such a scenario while providing plans to liberate and stabilise Raqqa without YPG involvement.
If the Pentagon and the Turkish military cannot come up with an agreement on this, the odd reality of supporting forces hostile to one another will likely persist and pit forces supported by the US and Turkey against each other on the ground.
The Trump administration has yet to make a final decision on directly arming the YPG and the consequences of that decision will be critical not only for the fight against ISIL, but for the broader dynamics of the US-Turkey relations.
If the administration decides to arm the YPG despite Turkish opposition, there may be backlash in the form of reduced cooperation at the least.
‘Long-lasting scars’
Even if Turkey decides to seek other ways of cooperation instead of increasing tensions, the scars from this episode will last a long time.
The Trump administration needs to move away from tactical alliances with groups such as the YPG towards creating serious alliances among state actors in order to build a strong coalition against ISIL.
The prospect of rapidly winning tactical military battles on the ground will be difficult to resist, but winning the broader war against ISIL requires longer-term policies that ensure post-ISIL stabilisation.
Especially if the US wants to avoid being responsible for a nation building process in Syria, akin to its largely failed efforts in Iraq, it will need to work with regional allies like Turkey.
Enduring success against ISIL cannot be achieved without the support and coordination of a strong and active international coalition.
Turkey has been part of the anti-ISIL coalition and it is the only coalition member with troops on the ground. Alienating Turkey in the fight against ISIL has been one of the most regrettable aspects of US policy in the waning years of the Obama administration and the Trump administration risks falling into the same trap.
According to news reports, the Pentagon will have more operational decision-making authority on the ground, but this should be accompanied by serious coalition work at the diplomatic and political level, recognising that ISIL is a product and a symptom of a broader breakdown of the political compact in Iraq and Syria.
To address the threat politically, the US needs allies, including Turkey, whose national security will be at stake in the outcome of the upcoming fights in Raqqa and beyond.
Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington, DC.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
Biden’s Nearly Impossible Task in Turkey
This article was first published in Politico on August 24, 2016.
Mistrust is at a new height following the July 15 coup attempt, and the veep had to do more than just say nice things.
Vice President Joe Biden was never going to have it easy on his visit to Turkey on Wednesday. Since the July 15 coup attempt, U.S.-Turkey relations have grown worse day by day, and Biden needed to deliver something dramatic and concrete. Above all, Ankara does not believe that Washington is seriously considering the Turkish government’s formal request this week for the extradition of suspected coup plotter Fethullah Gulen. To date, the Obama administration has appeared meek on this critical issue, pointing to the legal process while denying any prior knowledge of or culpability in the coup attempt. It also ppeared to be narrowly self-interested only in the fate of America’s Incirlik Air Base, rather than the welfare and stability of its NATO ally. Mutual mistrust is at a new and dangerous high.
Even prior to the failed coup attempt, U.S.-Turkey relations had been strained as a result of U.S. support for the YPG, the Syrian branch of the Kurdish PKK (which has been waging war against Turkey for decades). Then, as the coup took place, Turks were disheartened and dismayed with what they saw as the Obama administration’s “wait and see” approach in the early hours. Secretary of State John Kerry’s noncommittal early statement expressing a hope that there would be “stability and peace and continuity within Turkey” has been a sore point. Kerry said he did not have the details about the unfolding situation in Turkey, but he did not emphasize support for the democratically elected government or Turkish democracy either. President Barack Obama’s statement saying just that came in hours later but it had become pretty clear by that time that the coup was faltering. Additional statements by U.S. officials also were not helpful as they appeared to link Turkey’s NATO membership to its government’s post-coup performance on certain democratic principles, imposing an awkward conditionality on an alliance that has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Turkey relations.
Things got worse from there. Key members of the U.S. national security community appeared to question the legitimacy of the arrests of the coup plotters. All of this left the impression that the U.S. would have been ready to work with the coup leaders had the coup been successful, as was the case in Egypt.
Now the No. 1 issue is the status of Gulen, who under the protection of the U.S. government is managing the activities of his vast network of followers from Pennsylvania, to the detriment of Turkish national security. Biden and Obama should not kid themselves: Erdogan is deadly serious about this, and the evidence is that an overwhelming majority of Turks believe that the so-called Gulenists, under Gulen’s leadership, attempted the coup. It should not be forgotten that the Gulenist coup plotters opened fire against civilians, plotted to kill and capture the political leadership, and attacked the government buildings including Parliament. The unprecedented gall of a network of military officers to strike at Turkish democracy in such a callous manner was a national shock.
Nor should Obama and Biden allow themselves to be swayed by the bias of the American media, which has been largely anti-Erdogan since the crackdown began. Many western media outlets presented the post-July 15 purge of the Gulenist networks as yet another example of Erdogan’s attempt to suppress his political opponents. This line of argument largely ignored the emergence of a broad and unified anti-coup coalition in Turkish polity and society against the Gulenist plotters. The Obama administration also needs to avoid seeing this struggle through the narrow lens of a fight between Erdogan and his political opponents.
A significant U.S. concern has been about the status of the Incirlik military base and whether anti-Islamic State operations might be affected by U.S.-Turkish tensions. There is no question ISIL is a serious national security threat for Turkey—witness the suicide bombing at a Kurdish wedding last weekend—and the country will continue to participate in the anti-ISIL coalition. Still, the American focus on Incirlik in the wake of a coup attempt of historic proportions in Turkey comes across as tone deaf, to say the least.
Biden needed to deliver a strong message to alleviate Turkish suspicions that the U.S. is not taking the failed coup attempt seriously—and he needed to promise that the administration will support the Gulen extradition now under review by a U.S. court. That would go a long way. Still, with only six months left for the Obama administration, Biden also needed to leave his hosts reassured about the U.S. desire for continuity. The next U.S. president, whether Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump, will also have to move away from the Obama administration’s tendency to reduce its relations with Turkey to little more than the fight against ISIL.
The new administration must also accept that Turkey considers the Gulen organization as an existential threat and it should take a decisive stance in support of its NATO ally. Failing to do so, in the current atmosphere of suspicion, would be a disaster in U.S.-Turkey relations.
US alliance with Syrian PYD alienates Turkey
This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on June 2, 2016.
For the anti-ISIL strategy to succeed, having a serious strategic dialogue with Turkey would go a long way.
The most recent spat between the United States and Turkey over American support for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria is yet another example of increasing tensions between two NATO allies over their respective Syria policies.
The images showing US soldiers wearing the People’s Protection Units (YPG) insignia – the military wing of the PYD – drew sharp criticism in Turkey to which the US State Department and the Pentagon responded with conflicting views in an attempt to calm Turkey’s reaction.
A dangerous gamble
This most recent episode is an indication of an increasingly dangerous trend whereby the US’ exclusive focus on fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) is leading to tactical alliances with sub-state actors on the ground that threaten larger strategic relationships with traditional US allies.
The US government has already acknowledged at the highest levels that the PYD in Syria is aligned with the PKK, which has been waging a war against the Turkish government for more than three decades.
This was a remarkable admission given that until very recently, the administration and the US State Department had maintainedthat the PYD was a separate organisation from the PKK – an armed group that is recognised by both the US and Turkey as a terrorist organisation.
This could be interpreted as a dilemma forced upon the administration by the realities on the ground, but it points to the fact that the US strategy to destroy ISIL is missing some significant elements – such as getting full support and coordination of a critical ally such as Turkey.
The Obama administration started to support the PYD forces in autumn 2014 when ISIL surrounded the small town of Kobane adjacent to the Turkish border.
President Barack Obama explained to then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the air drops were simply to resupply the Kurdish forces fighting against ISIL – with the aim of preventing the fall of Kobane and dealing a serious blow to its propaganda machine.
The Pentagon seemed to have found it an effective way to bleed ISIL, which was focused on taking over Kobane to add to its aura of invincibility at the time.
This line of reasoning helped the PYD’s own public relations agenda and strategy to convince the West that it could function as an effective tool against ISIL.
Misrepresentation of Turkey
The Turkish government understood PYD’s political agenda and openly opposed the US help to the group. While opposed to the calls to arm the group directly, Turkey nevertheless facilitated the passage of military help from the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces through the Turkish territory to come to the aid of Kobane.
Despite this, Turkey was being presented in the Western media as “not doing enough” to save Kobane from ISIL. Some Kurdish leaders even claimed that Turkey was helping ISIL – an accusation that continues to be repeated without hard evidence.
All this was happening while Turkey admitted around 200,000 mostly Kurdish refugees from Kobane in a matter of days and treated hundreds of wounded fighters. Yet Turkey was often presented in the media as demonstrating an anti-Kurdish attitude and letting Kobane fall to ISIL.
Turkey’s concern is the political ambitions of the PYD and the regional game that the PKK is trying to play. This concern has only grown over the past year and a half, and created a serious source of tension in the US-Turkey relationship.
Some PKK leaders have left the Qandil Mountains – in northern Iraq where the PKK camps are headquartered – and joined the PYD in northern Syria starting with the Kobane fight, which served as a Kurdish nationalist moment and helped the organisation’s efforts to recruit inside Turkey.
The power vacuum in northern Syria that emerged in the wake of the civil war was an opportunity for the PKK to add new recruits to its cadres and to legitimise itself internationally.
The PKK’s regional ambitions and its hope to receive Western support contributed to the failure of the “peace process” between Turkey and the armed group in July 2015. The ungoverned spaces in Syria as a result of the civil war and the Western support against ISIL unsweetened a potential peace deal with Turkey.
Hindered constructive dialogue
Today, few dispute that the PYD and its armed wing YPG are the Syrian extension of the PKK. Turkey has been vehemently disputing the wisdom of using a designated organisation against another one.
The US help to the PYD exacerbates suspicions and stokes fear among the Turkish public that a PKK statelet is being created in Syria under American tutelage.
As the Turkish leadership has been unable to convince the Obama administration on pulling its support for the PYD, Turkey is pursuing a two-fold strategy: It is employing a military campaign against the PKK inside Turkey, and through drawing a red line along the Euphrates River, it aims to prevent the PYD from connecting its cantons inside Syria.
As the US uses the PYD against ISIL, the NATO allies are at odds over the PYD and risk working at cross purposes.
The Obama administration laments the ineffectiveness and fragmentation of Arab forces as well as the absence of effective partners on the ground.
There is obviously some truth in this, but the strategy to defeat ISIL cannot be at the same time alienating crucial regional allies such as Turkey.
The US should also be mindful of the political ambitions of its local partners, especially given that ISIL will not disappear only through a military campaign.
Turkey certainly understands it cannot prevent the US from supporting whomever it wants to, but this is hindering a constructive dialogue between the allies and it is a recipe for further alienation.
For the anti-ISIL strategy to succeed, having a sustained and serious strategic dialogue with Turkey would go a long way.
Failure to have this kind of strategic conversation would not only damage the US-Turkey relations, but it would also further complicate the fight against ISIL.
Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington DC.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
Kadir Ustun 