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Tag Archives: Turkey
EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement: Too Big to Fail
This analysis was coauthored by Lesley Dudden and Kadir Ustun and published by The SETA Foundation on June 5, 2017.
The analysis outlines the process through which the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) on refugees came into being and examines the impact of the agreement, including its challenges and successes.
The migrant crisis that has stemmed from the ongoing strife in the MENA region is one of the most devastating and consequential crises of modern times. Its impact has been felt across continents, in countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, along with European Union member states and the United States. In addition to unprecedented regional humanitarian challenges, the crisis shook Europe to its core by challenging its political institutions and humanitarian values. The rise of populism and Islamophobia in the West in general is closely associated with the migrant crisis that has pushed the capacity of countries to their limits.
Perhaps no relationship has been more affected by the refugee crisis than that between the European Union and Turkey. EU-Turkey relations have been strained and undermined by the migrant crisis to such a degree that it seems to have created a “make or break” moment in Turkey’s EU accession talks. This analysis outlines the process through which the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) on refugees came into being and examines the impact of the agreement, including its challenges and successes. It also seeks to understand how heightened tensions between the EU and Turkey will affect the longevity and effectiveness of the agreement.
Introduction
The migrant crisis that has stemmed from the ongoing strife in the MENA region is one of the most devastating and consequential crises in modern times. Its impact has been felt across continents, in countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, along with European Union (EU) member states and the United States. In addition to unprecedented regional humanitarian challenges, the crisis shook Europe to its core by challenging its political institutions and humanitarian values. The rise of populism and Islamophobia in the West in general is closely associated with the migrant crisis that has pushed countries capacities to their limits.
Perhaps no relationship has been more affected by the refugee crisis than that between the EU and Turkey. EU-Turkey relations have been strained and undermined by the migrant crisis to such a degree that it seems to have created a “make or break” moment in Turkey’s EU accession talks. Yet, the survival of the agreement indicates that benefits derived from stabilization of the large refugee influxes and illegal crossings do exist. This analysis outlines the process through which the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) on refugees came into being and examines the impact of the agreement, including its challenges and successes. It also seeks to understand how heightened tensions between the EU and Turkey will impact the longevity and effectiveness of the agreement.
It’s time for the US to stop alienating its allies
This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on May 6, 2017.
Turkey’s air strikes on PKK-affiliated groups in Iraq and Syria should be a wake-up call for the Trump administration.
Turkey’s April 25 air strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Iraq and its affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria were unexpected, but should not have surprised anyone.
Turkey has consistently maintained that the PKK’s presence in Iraq’s Sinjar region was unacceptable. Only two months into the Euphrates Shield Operation back in October 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged that Turkey would not tolerate Sinjar to be the “new Qandil”, referring to the terror group’s base of operations in northern Iraq.
While Turkish officials repeated their opposition to PKK’s presence in Sinjar several times, officials from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) also asked the PKK to leave the area.
Early in March 2017, clashes broke out between the PKK-linked Yazidi militia and the KRG’s Peshmerga fighters, a sign of increased tensions among Kurdish groups fuelled by the PKK’s lingering presence in the region.
Qandil mountains are located along the Iraq-Iran border in northeastern Iraq. The PKK have long been taking advantage of the mountainous terrain and using its bases there to train, plan attacks, and provide logistical support to its fighters. A similar base in Sinjar would help the PKK to operate in northwestern Iraq – an area near the Syrian border which is critically important for the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). US military planners must be betting on the promises of the PKK-linked Sinjar Resistance Units to help cut off ISIL’s route between Mosul and Raqqa.
A strain on US-Turkey relations
Turkey is opposed to not only PKK’s influence in the region, but also the US’ apparent tactical decision to utilise the PKK against ISIL. Turkey prefers a combination of Peshmerga forces and Free Syrian Army fighters to take the lead in the fight against ISIL, as these groups pose no threat to Turkey’s national security.
The PKK, on the other hand, has not only continued to conduct attacks against Turkey but has also sought to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria through its Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party, by making deals with prominent actors in Syria’s war, including Russia.
Creating a hub and a base for its operations in Sinjar is critical for the PKK, but actualisation of this plan would ironically violate the Iraqi-Syrian border – just like ISIL attempted to do in the past.
US military leaders seem to consider the PKK affiliates in Iraq and Syria as allies in the fight against ISIL.
The US Central Command went even further than that and is now reportedly patrolling the Syrian-Turkish border to discourage escalation and violence between two of its “most trusted partners in the fight to defeat ISIL”.
The US military did not hide its displeasure with the Turkish air strikes against the PKK and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria despite the fact that the US and Turkey are supposed to be part of the same anti-ISIS coalition. At the same time, neither President Trump, nor US officials at the cabinet level, have made any statements against Turkish operations.
The forthcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and his Turkish counterpart will surely involve extensive discussions around the US-Turkey strategic disconnect in the fight against ISIL and the PKK’s influence on the ground. It will be a challenge, however, to resolve this issue in one meeting.
Two sides will need to talk more often and in-depth about a military plan to root out ISIL but also, and more importantly, they will need to agree on a political plan that would establish stability on the ground in a post-ISIL scenario. Unfortunately, the anti-ISIL coalition’s efforts have been largely tactical and created space for non-state actors such as the PKK to take advantage of a security vacuum spanning Iraq and Syria.
There are signs that the Trump administration may be working on a more thoughtful approach that prioritises long-term strategies over short-term tactical gains.
It is not clear, however, if this new approach will translate into actual policy. So far, the White House has not made a political decision on whether to arm the YPG directly and include them in operations to liberate Raqqa from ISIL. Turkey has presented multiple proposals that exclude the YPG from the Raqqa operation and replace them with local Arab forces supported by Turkish troops.
Any scenario that empowers and legitimises PKK’s affiliates will certainly strain US-Turkey relations and risk weakening anti-ISIL operations. It is clear as a result of the April 25 operations that Turkey is determined to limit the reach and influence of the PKK and its affiliates on national security grounds. Beyond Turkey’s own national security requirements, it is difficult to see how allowing the PKK to control Arab-majority towns and to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria contributes to long-term stability.
The Trump administration needs to go beyond tactical wins and take its time to create a more careful strategy both to avoid alienating key allies, such as Turkey, and to conduct a sustainable anti-ISIL campaign.
Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington, DC.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
The Search for an American Foreign Policy and US-Turkey Relations in the Trump Era
This article was coauthored by Kadir Ustun and Kilic Kanat and was published by Orient on March 31, 2017.
The US must heed Turkish concerns in Syria
This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on March 15, 2017.
If the US insists on supporting the YPG against Turkey’s wishes, Syria’s post-ISIL stability is going to be in peril.
United States Senator John McCain has it right that the US has underestimated and, at times, disregarded Turkey’s concern over its support for the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. The US’ rationale for helping the YPG was predicated on a flawed anti-ISIL strategy that shied away from a comprehensive approach.
Turkish discomfort with the US support for the YPG is not based on an opposition against Syrian Kurds. Despite their efforts to promote themselves as the representatives of Syrian Kurds, the YPG poses a direct national security threat to Turkey.
The group is the Syrian arm of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – designated by Turkey, the US, and the European Union as a terrorist organisation – which has been fighting the Turkish government since 1984.
The two groups’ close ties have previously been acknowledged by US officials including the former US Defense Secretary Ash Carter in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.
The YPG draws much of its tactical and strategic direction as well as resources from the PKK and arms given to the YPG directly threaten Turkey, as they can be passed onto PKK fighters inside Turkey.
In other words, continued US support for the YPG lends legitimacy to the Syrian extension of a terror organisation threatening a NATO ally.
‘A misguided policy’
The US appears set to move forward with arming and supporting the PKK-linked YPG in preparation for the Raqqa operation.
This is not only the continuation of a misguided policy left over from the Obama administration, but it also risks irreparable damage to US’ relations with Turkey, a critical ally in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS).
Turkey has been quite hopeful about a potential change in Syria policy under the Trump administration, but all indications are that the new US administration’s Syria policy is also dominated by the fight against ISIL.
Under Donald Trump, the Pentagon is focused on achieving a victory against ISIL by working with “local partners” and limiting American “boots on the ground”. which is a continuation of the Obama administration’s strategy.
This approach disregards Turkey’s concerns and spells instability and unpredictability after dislodging ISIL from Raqqa and northern Syria.
The Obama administration invested in developing relations with the PKK-linked YPG fighters in Syria under the pretext that they were the only effective fighting force on the ground to fight ISIL.
This view ignored the political ambitions of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the political umbrella organisation of the Syrian Kurds, to create a de facto autonomous region in northern Syria and, perhaps inadvertently, emboldened the PKK against Turkey, as it sought international support and legitimacy.
It also failed to acknowledge the demographic engineering efforts or the human rights abuses of the PYD that sought to push out Arab populations from northern Syria.
While the YPG promoted itself as the only reliable, secular, effective fighting force in the region, the US chose to ignore that the YPG focused on establishing and consolidating their control in the region at the expense of Syrian Arabs and even other Kurdish groups.
Trump’s strategy
The Obama administration was following an “Iraq first” strategy in their efforts to defeat ISIL by subcontracting the fight against the armed group to YPG in northern Syria.
But the Trump administration wants to achieve speedy results through bold action, so there are signs that the US’ fight against ISIL might proceed on both fronts – in Iraq and Syria – in the near future.
This makes sense given that as a result of Obama administration’s reluctance to be involved in Syria, ISIL has had a lot of resources and breathing room in this country.
However, if not enough thought is given to post-ISIL stabilisation efforts in Raqqa and the rest of northern Syria, the military defeat of ISIL might be followed by instability and potential conflict between Turkey and the YPG.
Turkey has warned the US against such a scenario while providing plans to liberate and stabilise Raqqa without YPG involvement.
If the Pentagon and the Turkish military cannot come up with an agreement on this, the odd reality of supporting forces hostile to one another will likely persist and pit forces supported by the US and Turkey against each other on the ground.
The Trump administration has yet to make a final decision on directly arming the YPG and the consequences of that decision will be critical not only for the fight against ISIL, but for the broader dynamics of the US-Turkey relations.
If the administration decides to arm the YPG despite Turkish opposition, there may be backlash in the form of reduced cooperation at the least.
‘Long-lasting scars’
Even if Turkey decides to seek other ways of cooperation instead of increasing tensions, the scars from this episode will last a long time.
The Trump administration needs to move away from tactical alliances with groups such as the YPG towards creating serious alliances among state actors in order to build a strong coalition against ISIL.
The prospect of rapidly winning tactical military battles on the ground will be difficult to resist, but winning the broader war against ISIL requires longer-term policies that ensure post-ISIL stabilisation.
Especially if the US wants to avoid being responsible for a nation building process in Syria, akin to its largely failed efforts in Iraq, it will need to work with regional allies like Turkey.
Enduring success against ISIL cannot be achieved without the support and coordination of a strong and active international coalition.
Turkey has been part of the anti-ISIL coalition and it is the only coalition member with troops on the ground. Alienating Turkey in the fight against ISIL has been one of the most regrettable aspects of US policy in the waning years of the Obama administration and the Trump administration risks falling into the same trap.
According to news reports, the Pentagon will have more operational decision-making authority on the ground, but this should be accompanied by serious coalition work at the diplomatic and political level, recognising that ISIL is a product and a symptom of a broader breakdown of the political compact in Iraq and Syria.
To address the threat politically, the US needs allies, including Turkey, whose national security will be at stake in the outcome of the upcoming fights in Raqqa and beyond.
Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington, DC.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
Biden’s Nearly Impossible Task in Turkey
This article was first published in Politico on August 24, 2016.
Mistrust is at a new height following the July 15 coup attempt, and the veep had to do more than just say nice things.
Vice President Joe Biden was never going to have it easy on his visit to Turkey on Wednesday. Since the July 15 coup attempt, U.S.-Turkey relations have grown worse day by day, and Biden needed to deliver something dramatic and concrete. Above all, Ankara does not believe that Washington is seriously considering the Turkish government’s formal request this week for the extradition of suspected coup plotter Fethullah Gulen. To date, the Obama administration has appeared meek on this critical issue, pointing to the legal process while denying any prior knowledge of or culpability in the coup attempt. It also ppeared to be narrowly self-interested only in the fate of America’s Incirlik Air Base, rather than the welfare and stability of its NATO ally. Mutual mistrust is at a new and dangerous high.
Even prior to the failed coup attempt, U.S.-Turkey relations had been strained as a result of U.S. support for the YPG, the Syrian branch of the Kurdish PKK (which has been waging war against Turkey for decades). Then, as the coup took place, Turks were disheartened and dismayed with what they saw as the Obama administration’s “wait and see” approach in the early hours. Secretary of State John Kerry’s noncommittal early statement expressing a hope that there would be “stability and peace and continuity within Turkey” has been a sore point. Kerry said he did not have the details about the unfolding situation in Turkey, but he did not emphasize support for the democratically elected government or Turkish democracy either. President Barack Obama’s statement saying just that came in hours later but it had become pretty clear by that time that the coup was faltering. Additional statements by U.S. officials also were not helpful as they appeared to link Turkey’s NATO membership to its government’s post-coup performance on certain democratic principles, imposing an awkward conditionality on an alliance that has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Turkey relations.
Things got worse from there. Key members of the U.S. national security community appeared to question the legitimacy of the arrests of the coup plotters. All of this left the impression that the U.S. would have been ready to work with the coup leaders had the coup been successful, as was the case in Egypt.
Now the No. 1 issue is the status of Gulen, who under the protection of the U.S. government is managing the activities of his vast network of followers from Pennsylvania, to the detriment of Turkish national security. Biden and Obama should not kid themselves: Erdogan is deadly serious about this, and the evidence is that an overwhelming majority of Turks believe that the so-called Gulenists, under Gulen’s leadership, attempted the coup. It should not be forgotten that the Gulenist coup plotters opened fire against civilians, plotted to kill and capture the political leadership, and attacked the government buildings including Parliament. The unprecedented gall of a network of military officers to strike at Turkish democracy in such a callous manner was a national shock.
Nor should Obama and Biden allow themselves to be swayed by the bias of the American media, which has been largely anti-Erdogan since the crackdown began. Many western media outlets presented the post-July 15 purge of the Gulenist networks as yet another example of Erdogan’s attempt to suppress his political opponents. This line of argument largely ignored the emergence of a broad and unified anti-coup coalition in Turkish polity and society against the Gulenist plotters. The Obama administration also needs to avoid seeing this struggle through the narrow lens of a fight between Erdogan and his political opponents.
A significant U.S. concern has been about the status of the Incirlik military base and whether anti-Islamic State operations might be affected by U.S.-Turkish tensions. There is no question ISIL is a serious national security threat for Turkey—witness the suicide bombing at a Kurdish wedding last weekend—and the country will continue to participate in the anti-ISIL coalition. Still, the American focus on Incirlik in the wake of a coup attempt of historic proportions in Turkey comes across as tone deaf, to say the least.
Biden needed to deliver a strong message to alleviate Turkish suspicions that the U.S. is not taking the failed coup attempt seriously—and he needed to promise that the administration will support the Gulen extradition now under review by a U.S. court. That would go a long way. Still, with only six months left for the Obama administration, Biden also needed to leave his hosts reassured about the U.S. desire for continuity. The next U.S. president, whether Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump, will also have to move away from the Obama administration’s tendency to reduce its relations with Turkey to little more than the fight against ISIL.
The new administration must also accept that Turkey considers the Gulen organization as an existential threat and it should take a decisive stance in support of its NATO ally. Failing to do so, in the current atmosphere of suspicion, would be a disaster in U.S.-Turkey relations.
Kadir Ustun 