Tag Archives: Iraq

It’s time for the US to stop alienating its allies

This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on May 6, 2017.


Turkey’s air strikes on PKK-affiliated groups in Iraq and Syria should be a wake-up call for the Trump administration.


Turkey’s April 25 air strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Iraq and its affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria were unexpected, but should not have surprised anyone.

Turkey has consistently maintained that the PKK’s presence in Iraq’s Sinjar region was unacceptable. Only two months into the Euphrates Shield Operation back in October 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged that Turkey would not tolerate Sinjar to be the “new Qandil”, referring to the terror group’s base of operations in northern Iraq.

While Turkish officials repeated their opposition to PKK’s presence in Sinjar several times, officials from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) also asked the PKK to leave the area.

Early in March 2017, clashes broke out between the PKK-linked Yazidi militia and the KRG’s Peshmerga fighters, a sign of increased tensions among Kurdish groups fuelled by the PKK’s lingering presence in the region.

Qandil mountains are located along the Iraq-Iran border in northeastern Iraq. The PKK have long been taking advantage of the mountainous terrain and using its bases there to train, plan attacks, and provide logistical support to its fighters. A similar base in Sinjar would help the PKK to operate in northwestern Iraq – an area near the Syrian border which is critically important for the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). US military planners must be betting on the promises of the PKK-linked Sinjar Resistance Units to help cut off ISIL’s route between Mosul and Raqqa.

A strain on US-Turkey relations

Turkey is opposed to not only PKK’s influence in the region, but also the US’ apparent tactical decision to utilise the PKK against ISIL. Turkey prefers a combination of Peshmerga forces and Free Syrian Army fighters to take the lead in the fight against ISIL, as these groups pose no threat to Turkey’s national security.

The PKK, on the other hand, has not only continued to conduct attacks against Turkey but has also sought to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria through its Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party, by making deals with prominent actors in Syria’s war, including Russia.

Creating a hub and a base for its operations in Sinjar is critical for the PKK, but actualisation of this plan would ironically violate the Iraqi-Syrian border – just like ISIL attempted to do in the past.

US military leaders seem to consider the PKK affiliates in Iraq and Syria as allies in the fight against ISIL.

The US Central Command went even further than that and is now reportedly patrolling the Syrian-Turkish border to discourage escalation and violence between two of its “most trusted partners in the fight to defeat ISIL”.

The US military did not hide its displeasure with the Turkish air strikes against the PKK and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria despite the fact that the US and Turkey are supposed to be part of the same anti-ISIS coalition. At the same time, neither President Trump, nor US officials at the cabinet level, have made any statements against Turkish operations.

The forthcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and his Turkish counterpart will surely involve extensive discussions around the US-Turkey strategic disconnect in the fight against ISIL and the PKK’s influence on the ground. It will be a challenge, however, to resolve this issue in one meeting.

Two sides will need to talk more often and in-depth about a military plan to root out ISIL but also, and more importantly, they will need to agree on a political plan that would establish stability on the ground in a post-ISIL scenario. Unfortunately, the anti-ISIL coalition’s efforts have been largely tactical and created space for non-state actors such as the PKK to take advantage of a security vacuum spanning Iraq and Syria.

There are signs that the Trump administration may be working on a more thoughtful approach that prioritises long-term strategies over short-term tactical gains.

It is not clear, however, if this new approach will translate into actual policy. So far, the White House has not made a political decision on whether to arm the YPG directly and include them in operations to liberate Raqqa from ISIL. Turkey has presented multiple proposals that exclude the YPG from the Raqqa operation and replace them with local Arab forces supported by Turkish troops.

Any scenario that empowers and legitimises PKK’s affiliates will certainly strain US-Turkey relations and risk weakening anti-ISIL operations. It is clear as a result of the April 25 operations that Turkey is determined to limit the reach and influence of the PKK and its affiliates on national security grounds. Beyond Turkey’s own national security requirements, it is difficult to see how allowing the PKK to control Arab-majority towns and to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria contributes to long-term stability.

The Trump administration needs to go beyond tactical wins and take its time to create a more careful strategy both to avoid alienating key allies, such as Turkey, and to conduct a sustainable anti-ISIL campaign.

Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington, DC.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

The US must heed Turkish concerns in Syria

This article was first published in Al Jazeera English on March 15, 2017.


If the US insists on supporting the YPG against Turkey’s wishes, Syria’s post-ISIL stability is going to be in peril.


United States Senator John McCain has it right that the US has underestimated and, at times, disregarded Turkey’s concern over its support for the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. The US’ rationale for helping the YPG was predicated on a flawed anti-ISIL strategy that shied away from a comprehensive approach.

Turkish discomfort with the US support for the YPG is not based on an opposition against Syrian Kurds. Despite their efforts to promote themselves as the representatives of Syrian Kurds, the YPG poses a direct national security threat to Turkey.

The group is the Syrian arm of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – designated by Turkey, the US, and the European Union as a terrorist organisation – which has been fighting the Turkish government since 1984.

The two groups’ close ties have previously been acknowledged by US officials including the former US Defense Secretary Ash Carter in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

The YPG draws much of its tactical and strategic direction as well as resources from the PKK and arms given to the YPG directly threaten Turkey, as they can be passed onto PKK fighters inside Turkey.

In other words, continued US support for the YPG lends legitimacy to the Syrian extension of a terror organisation threatening a NATO ally.

‘A misguided policy’ 

The US appears set to move forward with arming and supporting the PKK-linked YPG in preparation for the Raqqa operation.

This is not only the continuation of a misguided policy left over from the Obama administration, but it also risks irreparable damage to US’ relations with Turkey, a critical ally in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS).

Turkey has been quite hopeful about a potential change in Syria policy under the Trump administration, but all indications are that the new US administration’s Syria policy is also dominated by the fight against ISIL.

Under Donald Trump, the Pentagon is focused on achieving a victory against ISIL by working with “local partners” and limiting American “boots on the ground”. which is a continuation of the Obama administration’s strategy.

This approach disregards Turkey’s concerns and spells instability and unpredictability after dislodging ISIL from Raqqa and northern Syria.

The Obama administration invested in developing relations with the PKK-linked YPG fighters in Syria under the pretext that they were the only effective fighting force on the ground to fight ISIL.

This view ignored the political ambitions of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the political umbrella organisation of the Syrian Kurds, to create a de facto autonomous region in northern Syria and, perhaps inadvertently, emboldened the PKK against Turkey, as it sought international support and legitimacy.

It also failed to acknowledge the demographic engineering efforts or the human rights abuses of the PYD that sought to push out Arab populations from northern Syria.

While the YPG promoted itself as the only reliable, secular, effective fighting force in the region, the US chose to ignore that the YPG focused on establishing and consolidating their control in the region at the expense of Syrian Arabs and even other Kurdish groups.

Trump’s strategy

The Obama administration was following an “Iraq first” strategy in their efforts to defeat ISIL by subcontracting the fight against the armed group to YPG in northern Syria.

But the Trump administration wants to achieve speedy results through bold action, so there are signs that the US’ fight against ISIL might proceed on both fronts – in Iraq and Syria – in the near future.

This makes sense given that as a result of Obama administration’s reluctance to be involved in Syria, ISIL has had a lot of resources and breathing room in this country.

However, if not enough thought is given to post-ISIL stabilisation efforts in Raqqa and the rest of northern Syria, the military defeat of ISIL might be followed by instability and potential conflict between Turkey and the YPG.

Turkey has warned the US against such a scenario while providing plans to liberate and stabilise Raqqa without YPG involvement.

If the Pentagon and the Turkish military cannot come up with an agreement on this, the odd reality of supporting forces hostile to one another will likely persist and pit forces supported by the US and Turkey against each other on the ground.

The Trump administration has yet to make a final decision on directly arming the YPG and the consequences of that decision will be critical not only for the fight against ISIL, but for the broader dynamics of the US-Turkey relations.

If the administration decides to arm the YPG despite Turkish opposition, there may be backlash in the form of reduced cooperation at the least.

‘Long-lasting scars’

Even if Turkey decides to seek other ways of cooperation instead of increasing tensions, the scars from this episode will last a long time.

The Trump administration needs to move away from tactical alliances with groups such as the YPG towards creating serious alliances among state actors in order to build a strong coalition against ISIL.

The prospect of rapidly winning tactical military battles on the ground will be difficult to resist, but winning the broader war against ISIL requires longer-term policies that ensure post-ISIL stabilisation.

Especially if the US wants to avoid being responsible for a nation building process in Syria, akin to its largely failed efforts in Iraq, it will need to work with regional allies like Turkey.

Enduring success against ISIL cannot be achieved without the support and coordination of a strong and active international coalition.

Turkey has been part of the anti-ISIL coalition and it is the only coalition member with troops on the ground. Alienating Turkey in the fight against ISIL has been one of the most regrettable aspects of US policy in the waning years of the Obama administration and the Trump administration risks falling into the same trap.

According to news reports, the Pentagon will have more operational decision-making authority on the ground, but this should be accompanied by serious coalition work at the diplomatic and political level, recognising that ISIL is a product and a symptom of a broader breakdown of the political compact in Iraq and Syria.

To address the threat politically, the US needs allies, including Turkey, whose national security will be at stake in the outcome of the upcoming fights in Raqqa and beyond.

Kadir Ustun is the Executive Director of the SETA Foundation in Washington, DC.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

 

Turkey’s ISIS Challenge

Reports that foreign fighters have used Turkish territory to enter Syria have led to accusations that Ankara has supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Others have argued that Turkey is partly to blame for failing to prevent the flow of foreign fighters into Syria. Ankara’s decision to maintain an “open door” policy with Syria for humanitarian reasons and the porous 900-km Syrian-Turkish border make it difficult to prevent foreign fighters or weapons from entering Syria through Turkey. Strategically, it is against Ankara’s interests to support ISIS, which has battled against the Western-recognized Syrian opposition, seized territory and helped bolster the Assad regime.

Turkey has a vested interest in ensuring that both Syria and Iraq maintain their territorial integrity and remain stable. The presence of terrorist groups pose a grave security threat to Turkey and Ankara has taken military actions against militants in Syria. The kidnapping of 49 Turkish consulate staff members in Mosul, including the consul-general, has forced Ankara to remain cautious and avoid any unilateral or multilateral military action. Nevertheless, Turkey announced that it would lend quiet support to the U.S.’s coalition against ISIS, noting that Western arms flowing to Baghdad should not exacerbate sectarian divisions. While it has been called a “reluctant” partner against ISIS, Turkey has advocated a strategy that addresses the underlying political causes of ISIS’ rise.

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What is Turkey’s Stake in Lebanon?

This commentary originally appeared on insideIRAN.org a project of The Century Foundation

WASHINGTON – Turkey’s mediation efforts in the most recent political crisis in Lebanon in January 2011 are driven by the assessment that a possible conflict would directly threaten Turkey’s interests. Turkey’s government believes it has a true stake in the resolution of the crisis since Turkey signed a series of free trade and strategic coordination agreements with Lebanon in November 2010. Intent on establishing stability in the region, Turkey consistently supports policies, such as visa liberation, free trade, and strategic cooperation councils, as a way to establish and maintain peace and stability in its neighborhood. Continue reading What is Turkey’s Stake in Lebanon?