Bu yazı ilk olarak 17 Mart 2018 tarihinde Sabah‘ta yayınlanmıştır.

Amerikan Başkanı Donald Trump’ın Dışişleri Bakanı Tillerson’ın görevine bir Twitter mesajıyla son vermesi Trump yönetiminin ilk gününden beri skandalları alışkanlık haline getirmesinin en son örneği oldu. Yönetimden istifa ederek veya kovularak ayrılanların listesi oldukça kabarık ancak Dışişleri Bakanı gibi kabinenin ağır toplarından birinin sosyal medyada kovulması bir ilk. Trump yönetiminde kadro değişikliği dedikodusunun olmadığı bir hafta olmadı desek abartı olmaz. “Kaos yönetimi” uygulayan ve bunu marifet sayarak övünen Başkan Trump memnun olmadığı kabine üyeleri hakkında Twitter’dan sert ve hatta aşağılayıcı mesaj atmaktan da çekinmiyor. Trump’ın bu tarzının aslında adı konmamış bir yönetim krizi olduğu ve önümüzdeki dönemde Amerikan dış politikasını daha da belirsizliğe sürükleyeceği söylenebilir.

Kişisel anlaşmazlıklarına bakıldığında Tillerson’ın Başkan için söylediği meşhur “moron” hakaretinin rol oynadığı aşikar ve Trump’ın bunu unutmadığını söylemek abartı olmayacaktır. Tillerson’ın bakanlık üst kadroları ve birçok önemli büyükelçilik (Almanya, Güney Kore, Türkiye, Güney Afrika) atamalarında Beyaz Saray’la anlaşamaması sonucu bu kadroların hala boş kalması da Trumpçı isimlerin kendisine yönelttiği şikayetler arasında. Tillerson ayrıca Trump’a yakın kadroları Dışişleri’ne atamayı reddederek Beyaz Saray’ın tepkisini çekti.

Siyasi tercihleri açısından bakıldığında ise dış politikada Başkan ve Bakan’ın adeta ayrı tellerden çalması neden gösterilebilir. Kuzey Kore‘yle ilgili olarak Trump’ın tansiyonu yükselttiği ve hatta nükleer savaş aşamasına gelindiği yorumları yapıldığı dönemde Tillerson eninde sonunda Kuzey Kore’yle doğrudan görüşmek zorunda olduklarını ve müzakere kanallarının açık olduğu yorumlarını yapıyordu. Trump el yükseltmeye çalışırken Tillerson müzakere yollarını zorluyordu. Başkan rahatsızlığını yine Twitter üzerinden Tillerson’a “kendini fazla yorma” mesajı vererek göstermişti. Benzer biçimde Amerikan kamuoyu baskısına rağmen Rusya’yı veya Rus Devlet Başkanı Putin’i eleştirmekten kaçınan Trump’ın Tillerson’ın Moskova’ya karşı sert söyleminden rahatsız olduğu aşikar. Hem Kuzey Kore hem de Rusya meselelerinde Tillerson’ın özellikle Savunma Bakanı Mattis’le koordineli hareket ederek Beyaz Saray’dan uzak bir Dışişleri Bakanı profili çizmesi Başkan’ı rahatsız ediyordu.

Ortadoğu barış süreci gibi önemli bir dosyayı damadı Kushner’e emanet eden Trump, Kudüs kararında olduğu gibi tek taraflı ve maksimalist adımlar atmayı seviyor. Netanyahu’ya ve İsrail sağ pozisyonuna yakınlığı bilinen Kushner’in Ortadoğu’ya bakışında da Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE) çizgisine yakın bir duruşu var. Bu iki ülkenin Katar’a uyguladığı ambargo karşısında Washington’da birbirine zıt iki yaklaşım oluştu. Trump yönetiminin “yetişkinleri”ni temsil eden Tillerson ve Mattis, Katar’ın Amerikan müttefiki olduğunu ve terörle mücadelede yanlarında yer aldığını söylerken Trump Katar’ı teröre destek vermekle suçlamıştı. Körfez kriziyle birlikte Trump yönetimi içerisindeki ayrışma net bir biçimde ortaya çıkmıştı.

Amerikan askeri tarihçisi ve analisti Mark Perry’nin aktardığına göre Kushner Katar’a uygulanacak ambargodan önceden haberi olmasına rağmen Trump’a haber vermemişti. İsrail-Suud-BAE ekseninde Tillerson-Mattis kanadına karşı paralel bir Ortadoğu politikasıoluşturmaya çalışan Kushner ve Washington’daki İsrail’e yakın neocon destekçileri Tillerson’ın sonunu getiren ittifakı temsil ediyordu Perry’ye göre. Trump’ın hem Körfez krizinde takındığı tavra hem de Amerikan Büyükelçiliğini Kudüs’e taşıma kararına bakıldığında bu ittifakın fazlaca etkin olduğu anlaşılıyor.

Tillerson’ın gönderilmesinin önemli nedenlerinden birinin İran nükleer anlaşmasının olduğu anlaşılıyor. Başkan Trump Obama’nın en büyük dış politika başarılarından saydığı anlaşmayı iptal etmek için çok çaba sarf etti.
Anlaşma uluslararası nitelikte olduğu için tek taraflı iptal edemeyen Trump, İran’ın anlaşmaya uyduğunu kerhen onaylamak zorunda kalmış ancak en son onaylamayı reddederek topu Kongre’ye atmıştı.
Kampanya döneminde anlaşmayı yırtıp atma sözü veren ve özellikle Obama’nın siyasi mirasını yok etmeyi kendine misyon edinen Trump için Tillerson’ın bu konuda direnmesi de önemli rol oynamışa benziyor.

Bundan sonra ne olacak?

Tillerson’ın görevine son verilmesinin nedenleri aslında eski CIA Direktörü ve yeni Dışişleri Bakanı Pompeo’nun nasıl bir dış politika çizgisi izleyebileceğinin ipuçlarını da veriyor. Pompeo’nun Trump’la kişisel olarak çok daha iyi anlaştığı ve kendi başına bir dış politika çizgisi oluşturmama konusunda Başkan’a güven verdiği biliniyor.
Tillerson’ın Trump’ın önceliklerini göz ardı etmesi gönderilmesinin önemli nedenlerinden biri sayıldığı için Pompeo Başkan’dan bağımsız davranıyor görünmemeye özen gösterecektir. Bakanlık kadrolarına da bir an önce Trumpçı ve İsrail sağına yakın neocon isimleri ataması hiç de sürpriz olmayacaktır.

İran’a karşı daha sert bir politika izlemeyi savunduğu bilinen Pompeo’nun “makul şahin” Savunma Bakanı Mattis’le nasıl bir ilişki kuracağı önemli olacak.
Her iki isim de bölgede İran’ın etkisini azaltmak istiyor ancak Mattis hem Kore Yarımadası hem de Ortadoğu’da tansiyonu artıracak ve ABD’yi yeni bir askeri çatışmanın içine çekecek adımlardan kaçınan bir isim olarak öne çıkıyor.
Önümüzdeki dönemde Amerikan dış politikasında “kaos yönetimi” sayesinde belirsizliğin artması, İsrail sağına yakın neoconların öne çıkması ve “Ben yaptım oldu” tarzı tek taraflılığın ağırlık kazanması sürpriz olmayacak.

This article was first published by New Turkey on March 13, 2018.

Abandoning the myths about the YPG would serve the US interests. Then comes the hard task of crafting a realistic Syria policy that is coordinated with Turkey and one that can achieve lasting stability.

Ever since Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria, its goals have been mischaracterized and quite a few myths continue to thrive. One of these is that Turkey is conducting the operation because it cannot tolerate any “Kurdish” gains in northern Syria. It has become commonplace to describe the PKK-linked YPG as “American-backed Kurdish militias” or simply “Kurds” as if they represent the majority or all of Syrian Kurds. In fact, the YPG has sought to dominate the region at the expense of Kurdish groups not aligned with the PKK.

Back in the fall of 2014 during the battle for Kobani, the YPG refused to allow a large contingent of Peshmerga forces to help with the fight against Daesh. At the time, Turkey had even allowed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from Iraq to travel through its territory – a first in Turkish history – to arrive in Kobani. From the beginning, the YPG has only been interested in creating a PKK stronghold in northern Syria. This is clearly unacceptable for Turkey but it is a far cry from an “obsession” with any Kurdish political gain in Syria. If anything, Turkey has encouraged unity among Syrian Kurds and sought to convince the PYD to join the opposition forces against Assad. Turkey also supported non-PYD Kurdish representation in a national dialogue congress.

Another major myth has been the YPG’s “effectiveness” as ground forces against Daesh. It should be remembered that the PYD had made a deal with the Assad regime at the beginning of the Syrian uprising. It was only after the sudden rise of Daesh that the YPG started to promote itself as “staunchly secular” and fearless fighters against Daesh. The Obama administration decided to utilize them as “local partners” against Daesh in an environment where the American public was opposed to any “boots on the ground.” Ever since then, the YPG has dominated the military battlefield largely thanks to US military supportincluding critical air cover and protection.

The devil’s bargain continued under the Trump administration but the YPG’s utility is now proving limited at best. The political commitment of the YPG to the PKK’s goals in Syria is so strong that they announced that they would redeploy their forces from the Daesh fight to Afrin against Turkey. The irony should not be escaping anyone that the YPG is willing to abandon the fight against Daesh – the very rationale for the US support – in order to fight a US NATO ally. Some analysts have suggested that the US can broker a deal with Turkey and somehow convince the YPG to sever ties with the PKK. However, Turkey’s Afrin operation has exposed that the congruity between the two is so deep and organic that the PKK’s strategic and political goals take priority over the fight against Daesh.

The myths about the YPG can be maintained so far as the US policymakers choose to ignore realities on the ground for political expediency or the lack of a coherent Syria policy. Turkey’s Afrin operation has already exposed many of the ill-conceived notions about the YPG. It is time for the US to coordinate with Turkey strategically and rely on its NATO ally for its policy goals. Establishing stability in northern Syria is a common goal but it cannot come at the expense of Turkey’s national security. Ensuring that Daesh does not come back is also a common goal but the YPG cannot be relied upon to achieve it. Abandoning the myths about the YPG would serve the US well. Then comes the hard task of crafting a realistic Syria policy that is coordinated with Turkey and one that can achieve lasting stability.

This article was first published by New Turkey on March 6, 2018.

Recent visits by Trump administration officials have resulted in the creation of a strategic conversation mechanism but it is not clear how much progress can be made. After all, administration officials have not signaled a serious rethinking of the U.S. support for the YPG.

The U.S. must end its military and political support to the YPG not only to repair ties with Turkey but also to bring long lasting stability to Syria. If the U.S. is interested in a semblance of stability in Syria, it is a no brainer that it needs to work with Turkey and not with the PKK’s Syrian branch. The YPG is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security and it is not a reliable insurer of stability in any meaningful sense of the word. It only makes sense for the U.S. the U.S. to work with its state allies like Turkey, not a terror group’s extension.

The PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG, has sought to carve out an autonomous zone in northern Syria by securing U.S. support under the pretext of fighting Daesh and by kicking Arab populations out of their lands. The PKK utilized the rise of Daesh and secured this as an opportunity by promising the U.S. that it will fight the terrorist organization in return for military and political support. The Obama administration played along starting with the Kobani fight and bought into PKK’s game plan despite Turkey’s multiple warnings. However, starting with Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey displayed its determination in terms that it will not tolerate the PKK’s efforts to create a statelet for itself with U.S. support.

While rebranding the PKK’s Syrian forces and integrating them into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may have looked like a clever move, it was simply a gimmick to evade Turkey’s reaction and avoid legal complications, as U.S. law does not permit providing support to terror organizations. By investing in a partnership with the YPG, the U.S. created a center of gravity around it, driving many smaller groups to be part of the SDF. The SDF might include many non-YPG fighters but the YPG has remained the dominant group accomplishing its military and political goals.

The already existing command structure owed to the PKK made it easier for U.S. planners to invest in the YPG and to promote them as the most “effective fighters.” In reality, though, their “success” against Daesh always entailed U.S. air cover and military support including heavy weaponry. If one of the central goals of U.S. policy is stability, a group that depends on U.S. support so much cannot deliver it.

The YPG systematically pushed Arab populations out from their lands in northern Syria, rendering them refugees in Turkey. The YPG was able to justify this demographic engineering under the pretext that many of these Sunni Arabs might have ties to Daesh. With the blessing and support of the U.S. forces, they are now the dominant force controlling Arab majority cities like Raqqa. U.S. policymakers must recognize the reality that the YPG they have invested in is a destabilizing factor itself. Turkey’s Afrin operation has shown that the YPG has its own political agenda and it is not only interested in fighting Daesh. Moreover, it is ready to make deals with all actors, including the Assad regime.

Turkey is out of patience. Multiple promises by the Obama and Trump administrations have proven to be empty rhetoric. Recent visits by Trump administration officials have resulted in the creation of a strategic conversation mechanism but it is not clear how much progress can be made. After all, administration officials have not signaled a serious rethinking of the U.S. support for the YPG. If the U.S. treats the discussions in this new mechanism as brainstorming sessions with no concrete action on the ground, they may prove to be futile. “Working through” Turkey’s concerns may not cut it this time around; a real strategic conversation needs to start addressing Turkey’s national security requirements.

This article was first published by New Turkey on Sebtember 27, 2017.

An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would probably lead to yet another round of conflict in Iraq’s never-ending civil war. In the absence of any international backing and legitimacy, the KRG leaders will need to think long and hard before declaring independence.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) referendum on independence is no great news for an already fractured country and a destabilized region. Independence is an openly stated goal of the Iraqi Kurds who consistently declare it is only a question of when, not if. However, the only outside support for KRG independence is confined to the Israeli promise to recognize a potential Kurdish state. Most stakeholders, including the U.S. and Turkey, oppose the referendum and support Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraq has monumental challenges ahead including terrorism, reconstruction, refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional proxy wars being fought in its territory. A potential declaration of independence would most likely exacerbate these problems and lead to further destabilization of the country.

Some analysts have argued that Turkey might be open to or even embrace a declaration of independence given its close ties with the KRG. Turkey’s reaction so far has been anything but. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that Turkey might be open to Iraqi Kurdish independence especially if the declaration is not sudden and comes after negotiations with the Baghdad government over the long term. The reality is that the referendum is unlikely to lead to a declaration of independence and the KRG will seek an amicable divorce through talks with Baghdad. The most recent agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to fight against ISIS was supported and brokered by the U.S. In the case of independence, however, there is no such common ground and there does not seem to exist any available U.S. or Turkish patronage.

Iraq is fractured and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Unaddressed grievances in the country will likely exacerbate political instability despite the most recent military defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The most important reason for the emergence of ISIS was the failure of the Iraqi political system that left Sunnis out of the political system. Even in the very unlikely scenario where the KRG successfully negotiates Kurdistan’s exit from Iraq, the lack of Sunni say in the matter will continue to destabilize the country and the broader region. An Iraqi Kurdish exit will also be tested by the struggle over disputed territories and the lack of a political agreement.

Turkey’s economic investments and security interests along with its political relations with the KRG make it a critical actor. However, Turkey-KRG relations are now deeply unsettled by what looks like the KDP leader Barzani’s bid to prevail over his rivals with the promise of an elusive independence. If Turkey had supported the independence referendum, the KRG would have overcome a major hurdle in terms of international legitimacy. However, from Turkey’s perspective, the independence bid is a deeply destabilizing move in an environment where, only a few months ago, ISIS held large swaths of Iraqi territory. Turkey has had close relations with the KRG but multiple statements by Turkish officials against the upcoming referendum illustrate the limits of Turkish support for the KRG. Turkish opposition to the breakup of Iraq is so strong that Turkey might take punitive steps, including imposing sanctions against the KRG.

Turkey’s argument against Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence is based on a variety of considerations. First, yet another chapter in the long Iraqi civil war would bring about another layer of instability to the region and adversely impact Turkish economic and security interests. Second, potential new conflict could open up space in Iraq for the PKK which has already gained ground in Syria due to the prolonged civil war and American support for the PYD. Third, Turkey continues to value its relationship with the rest of Iraq and is particularly invested in the fate of the Turkmen community. Fourth, unintended consequences of the breakup of Iraq promise a whole new set of complications that would threaten Turkey’s border security and might weaken its current influence in northern Iraq.

Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the KRG leadership but it does not want to be the enabler of a breakup of Iraq. Turkey spent a lot of energy during the tenure of the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to ensure Sunni inclusion in the Iraqi political system. In an environment where the Sunnis have virtually no say in the future of Iraq, Turkey would not want to contribute to their further alienation by midwifing an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. If the referendum leads to a new era of ethnic conflict, Turkey’s security and economic interests would be negatively, potentially empowering the PKK.

In many ways, the independence referendum has placed the horse before the cart, so to speak. There was already a referendum in 2005 with an overwhelming support for independence. Repeating a referendum with predictably similar results only indicates an effort to strengthen Barzani’s hand politically rather than a step in achieving “self-determination.” While the votes are yet to be tallied, Barzani has officially claimed victory in the referendum vote – an expected repeat of the 2005 referendum result. Yet, it is not entirely clear if this result will actually empower the KRG’s hand, as the Baghdad government has already ruled out negotiations labeling the referendum “illegal.”

The KRG President Barzani has called for negotiations with Baghdad for independence, however, the potential punitive measures and political alienation by Turkey and Iran may weaken the KRG’s hand in forcing such negotiations. In fact, Iran has already closed its border shared with northern Iraq and Turkey is mulling whether to close the border. The KRG’s referendum bid was clearly to prop up Barzani’s position against rival Kurdish parties who have been calling for a new presidential election. Having gone forward without the agreement and patronage of two neighboring powers, Iran and Turkey, the KRG has risked political isolation, not to mention potential for conflict.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq has gone through periods of crises and chaos with short periods of only “relative” calm. It is currently in a highly fragile state and the breakup of the country through the establishment of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would probably lead to yet another round of conflict in Iraq’s never-ending civil war. In the absence of any international backing and legitimacy, the KRG leaders will need to think long and hard before declaring independence.