There are many reasons to be skeptical of the most recent U.S.-Russian agreement for a cessation of hostilities in Syria. The High Negotiations Committee (HNC), representing the main opposition bloc, initially announced its commitment to the agreement on the condition that Russia and the regime end airstrikes and the bombing of civilians. But it did not take them too long to claim that Russia was in fact intensifying its bombing campaign. Bashar Assad’s regime also committed to the agreement while asserting that operations against DAESH and al-Nusra Front would continue. However, there is little reason to trust the regime will honor its commitment given its past behavior. In fact, the regime and Russia will more likely interpret the agreement as their campaign to destroy the opposition under the pretext of fighting terrorism having carte blanche.

Even if the opposition holds its end of the bargain, Russia, Iran-backed militias and the regime may undermine the agreement by attacking opposition-held areas in the name of targeting terrorists, specifically al-Nusra Front, which is present in many locations. Such doubts have repeatedly been expressed by the opposition. Even the Pentagon and CIA chiefs voiced skepticism about Russian commitment to the deal. This is a serious shortcoming of the announced agreement, as it gives a back door to the regime if it continues to attack the opposition while pretending to hold to the cease-fire.

Another potential shortcoming of the agreement is that it does not spell out exactly what might happen in the case of non-compliance. The deal calls for a task force to monitor compliance by the parties, but there is no serious consequence clearly laid out except that the task force would determine appropriate action and the parties would be left out of the protections offered by the agreement. Such vagueness might be purposeful, but it will have no way of deterring the parties from non-compliance. Continue reading US-Russia Agreement Offers Little Hope of Ending the Syrian Conflict →

Turkey’s election cycle continues, as the country heads for a new round of elections this November. Following the June 2015 elections, it proved impossible to establish a coalition government, and now, the caretaker government under Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leadership, is taking the country to “repeat” elections. Despite receiving nearly 41 percent of the vote, the AK Party could not form a single party government because the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) passed the national threshold with 13 percent and secured 80 parliamentary seats. The June elections showed that the electorate still saw the AK Party as the only party capable of governing, while denying the ruling party yet another single party government. The wildcard – that is, the HDP passing the national threshold – worked against the AK Party in June. Whether the HDP can surpass the threshold once again in a maximum security political atmosphere will be critical to these next election results. Continue reading Turkey’s Repeat Elections: The Kurdish Wildcard →

Download PDF

Turkey’s struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took on a new dimension in the wake of the Suruc bombing on July 20, 2015. Turkish policy has now shifted to allow the use of Incirlik air base by U.S. forces. Moreover, there seems to be a tentative agreement on creating a safe zone for the moderate opposition fighters that could eventually allow for potential repatriation of some of the refugees currently residing in Turkey. Recent Turkish efforts to ramp up the fight against ISIL and the Suruc bombing itself seem to have served as a catalyzer for the revision of Turkish policy. This shift may bring the two NATO allies closer in how they see the dynamics in northern Syria but it should not be mistaken for full agreement or coordination of their respective Syria policies. In the long run, however, differences in terms of fighting against ISIL will likely persist, as Turkey still considers ISIL as an outcome of the broader conflict exacerbated by the Assad regime while the U.S. shows no sign of adopting a comprehensive Syria policy to address the challenges beyond ISIL.

Ever since the Kobani resistance in the fall of 2014, which Turkey supported by allowing Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces to pass through its territory and by providing shelter for the civilian population of the town, an increasingly visible divergence between the U.S. and Turkish strategies toward the Syrian civil war has been laid bare. Turkey has insisted on a comprehensive strategy toward the war as a whole before committing militarily in the fight against ISIL in the Syrian territory. The U.S., in contrast, focused narrowly on containing and rolling back ISIL by using local forces such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to allow for its “no boots on the ground” approach. Turkey’s priority has been to prevent the inflow of refugees and protect itself against spillover effects of the conflict while helping the Syrian opposition. The fight against ISIL necessitated a serious engagement over the entirety of the conflict in addition to active cooperation among Turkey, the U.S., and the European allies on intelligence related to foreign fighters and ISIL’ financial networks. The U.S. administration, however, adopted a short-term solution by forming an international coalition to conduct air strikes against ISIL, expecting local actors to reclaim territory from ISIL. Based on this approach, the U.S. started to cooperate with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) Syrian affiliate, the PYD, which added a new dimension to the already existing and deepening disagreement between Turkey and the U.S. Continue reading Toward U.S.-Turkey Realignment on Syria →