This article was first published by New Turkey on May 21, 2018.

The Middle East as a whole has to live with a reality where the U.S. not only fails to provide leadership but reduces its role to supporting the Israeli cause with a few regional backers. A U.S. policy designed to appease the American evangelicals and the Netanyahu government can only spell further disaster.

There were two images broadcast to the world last week that illustrated the end of the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process as we know it. The contrast between celebratory images of the opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem and the disturbing images of violence from Gaza was deeply unsettling. They were not only a reminder of the failed U.S. policy, but more importantly, an illustration of what might be in store for the region as a result of the Trump administration’s “disruptive” policies. If the Jerusalem decision is any indication, the administration’s next moves in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be to embrace and fully endorse the Israeli demands without any regard to the Palestinian aspirations, which can only bring about more violence and instability.

The administration has touted its unilateral Jerusalem move as honoring a long-held American promise and a recognition of the reality on the ground. That reality, however, is one that has been created by Israel under the watch of successive U.S. administrations. Israel has rarely, if ever, negotiated in good faith, always blaming the Palestinians for the failure of the by now defunct “peace process.” U.S. efforts to stop or even slow down the settlement activity proved futile in the past and the Trump administration is not even interested in trying. The U.S.’ Jerusalem recognition fits the pattern of Israel getting its way by deepening its occupation without giving up anything that would serve peace.

The U.S., as the only power that could exact a serious cost on the Israeli intransigence, is now choosing to sign on to a common cause with the Netanyahu government, which intends to destroy any Palestinian political aspirations. Holding Hamas responsible for Gaza’s plight while ignoring the Israeli attacks on Palestinian demonstrators along the Gaza border last week is a convenient tool of denying any legitimacy to Palestinian demands. The Trump administration as well as the U.S. Congress seem to have signed on to this approach. This is clearly siding with the Israeli agenda rather than recognizing the reality of the ever-deepening occupation.

President Trump delivered two major victories – withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Jerusalem move – to the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu within a matter of weeks without any Israeli concessions toward peace. With the Jerusalem move, he is delivering a major promise to its Evangelical supporters as well. Divisions and the muted response by the Arab world is all too clear and no regional power besides Turkey seems interested in supporting Palestinian aspirations in any serious way. Many commentators have pointed out the lack of strong reaction against the Jerusalem move and they may be right to a certain extent. However, the abandoning of the U.S. role in the peace process once and for all only confirms those who have argued all along that the U.S. is only interested in advancing and protecting Israel’s agenda.

The silver lining in the Jerusalem decision could have been that the U.S. no longer pretends to be an honest broker of peace. However, the administration continues to claim that the Jerusalem decision will actually serve peace and they have a plan to achieve it. The administration’s mysterious “peace plan” will likely be a unilateral one, receiving the support only of some of the Gulf nations and Israel. The Palestinian cause matters in the Middle East and it will not be resolved with the acquiescence of a few Arab nations to a unilateral declaration by the Trump administration.

The Jerusalem move reminds us that the U.S. role in the region under Trump promises to exacerbate existing fault lines and worsen conflicts. Trump has actually acknowledged the bankruptcy of the U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but in such a way as to heighten tensions without a viable peace plan. The region as a whole has to live with a reality where the U.S. not only fails to provide leadership but reduces its role to supporting the Israeli cause with a few regional backers. A U.S. policy designed to appease the American evangelicals and the Netanyahu government can only spell further disaster.

This article was first published by New Turkey on May 8, 2018.

Reversing the deal may well result in catastrophe but it will more likely lead to a tit-for-tat in the region where the administration will be able to claim that it is rolling back Iran. That may prove to be the new status quo.

President Trump is widely expected to walk away from the Iran nuclear deal by refusing to issue a sanctions waiver this week. One of Trump’s central attacks on the Obama administration has been the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) itself on grounds that it gave Iran billions of dollars that failed to prevent Iran from going down the nuclear path. Undoing the most important foreign policy piece of the Obama legacy is obviously irresistible for President Trump, who has had to begrudgingly certify that Iran was in compliance with the agreement. The President’s strong critique of the nuclear deal is now coupled with the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s “intelligence coup” last week that seems to give Trump further political cover, though it is doubtful he really needed it. Should the President pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal, it is unclear what will replace it, and perhaps more importantly, what U.S. policy towards Iran will be.

Candidate Obama had made the headlines when he suggested he would talk to Iran without preconditions in the 2008 presidential campaign. He sought a nuclear agreement with Iran that would ultimately lead to a historic rapprochement with the U.S. Obama suggested that Iran had a rightful place in the region and would need to “share” the region with Saudi Arabia among others, signaling the regional accommodation of Iran.

Although the Obama administration constantly argued that they were focused only on the nuclear deal, it was clear to everyone that it would have broader strategic and political implications. Nevertheless, Obama insisted on the narrow focus of the nuclear deal in an effort to avoid confronting Iran in the region, which could ultimately jeopardize the deal. The regional accommodation in return for the nuke deal policy has been partly responsible for the expansion of Iran’s strategic influence in the region. At the same time, the deal arguably prevented a potential military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which could have led to a regional confrontation.

President Trump has repeatedly attacked the Iran deal as an “insane” one and suggested its renegotiation but the outlines of a new approach are missing. The Obama administration had spent months to bring Europeans, Russia and China on board for imposing sanctions on Iran but the Trump administration has so far contended itself with strong rhetorical attacks on the deal without providing a roadmap or explaining its goals. Trump has indicated he might be open to a “better deal” under pressure from European allies but there is no serious diplomatic effort to build a front against Iran. Undermining the deal seems to be the sole focus at the moment. Ripping up the nuclear deal may not lead to an immediate military confrontation given President Trump’s non-interventionist streak despite his harsh rhetoric and threats.

The U.S. pullout of the nuclear deal will certainly introduce tensions into a region that is already a sea of uncertainty and unpredictability. Trump’s domestic agenda’s nationalist and isolationist tendency would probably preclude a regime change policy toward Iran. Trump is unlikely to seek regime change and will be unwilling to push back against the Iran militarily to avoid yet another costly war in the region. The president may contend himself with undoing the nuclear deal without replacing it with another deal or another comprehensive Iran policy.

A new Iran policy would need to have a theory of the case addressing Iran’s regional role and its relations with the U.S. Obama’s Iran policy saw a legitimate role for Iran in the region and used the nuke deal for a future normalization of ties. It is not clear if Trump has such a theory of the case and whether he wants to devise a new Iran policy beyond undoing the nuclear deal. Reversing the deal may well result in catastrophe but it will more likely lead to a tit-for-tat in the region where the administration will be able to claim that it is rolling back Iran. That may prove to be the new status quo.

This article was first published by New Turkey on May 1, 2018.

President Macron might have convinced Trump to reconsider pulling U.S. troops out of Syria “too soon” but the central disconnect between fighting terrorism and larger strategic goals in the U.S. approach seems beyond a single administration’s preferences.

In his most recent visit to Washington, French President Emmanuel Macron appealed to President Trump to avoid leaving Syria too soon. Trump had already announced that the U.S. would withdraw from Syria “very soon” but U.S. military leaders immediately questioned the wisdom of pulling out. They warned against a premature pullout that would leave the ground to Russia and Iran as well as risk the return of Daesh. In a joint press conference with Macron, President Trump seemed to oscillate between bringing troops home and giving Iran an “open season to the Mediterranean.” In many ways, Trump’s statements summarize the inherent contradictions in U.S. policy in Syria. Ever since the U.S. has defined the defeat of Daesh as its main and increasingly exclusive goal in Syria, it has been unable to articulate a policy that reconciled its strategic goals and the domestic public opinion disfavoring a larger military commitment.

U.S. policy on Syria during the Obama administration suffered from the same contradiction between fighting terrorism and regional strategic goals. Obama emphasized working with local forces in fighting Daesh while prioritized the nuclear deal with Iran. Regularly invoking the danger of mission creep, Obama refused to articulate a comprehensive policy that would require American troop commitment to Syria. Using the PKK’s Syrian branch the YPG, the Obama administration brought great strains to the relationship with Turkey as well. Satisfying the domestic public opinion with a “light footprint” in Syria and striking a nuclear deal with Iran guided Obama’s refusal to commit the U.S. to a leadership role in ending the Syrian civil war.

President Trump benefited during the presidential campaign from a strong critique of the Iraq war and a harsh rhetoric on Daesh. He promised to use overwhelming firepower against Daesh and to avoid any new wars in the Middle East. This approach reflected the U.S. public opinion that agreed with the need to fight terrorism but disagreed with a larger involvement in the Middle East to address that same problem. In many ways, this fundamental contradiction that existed during the Obama administration remains under the Trump administration as well. While it seems straightforward to make the anti-terrorism argument, neither administration seems capable of making a convincing argument to the American public about the need for a comprehensive Middle East policy.

While President Obama sought a nuclear deal with Iran that would eventually lead to the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran, Trump has been adamant about abandoning the deal and pushing back against Iran. Obama made the nuclear deal a centerpiece of his Middle East policy but failed to address the Syrian Civil War, hoping he could somehow compartmentalize it from relations with Iran. The Trump administration has been talking about the “malign influence” of Iran in the region but a comprehensive policy is still lacking. The media reports that President Trump received assurances from his new National Security Advisor Bolton that he would not start new wars. It shows that President Trump is willing to push back against Iran but he wants it to stop short of war, an approach in line with the domestic public opinion.

President Macron might have convinced Trump to reconsider pulling U.S. troops out of Syria “too soon” but the central disconnect between fighting terrorism and larger strategic goals in the U.S. approach seems beyond a single administration’s preferences. The legacy of the Iraq war has had a strong role in the election of both Presidents Obama and Trump. The need to address international terrorism has defined both administrations’ Middle East policies. When it comes to crafting a strategy toward Iran, however, neither has defined a comprehensive vision that has been bought by the American public. It is going to take a lot more creativity than Macron’s advice and warnings to come up with a strategic vision that reconciles the U.S. strategic goals and domestic public opinion.

This article was first published by New Turkey on April 17, 2018.

President Trump has also given the message that he wants a U.S. pullout of Syria. Multiple priorities and conflicting rhetoric promise the continuation of an incoherent U.S. policy in the Middle East. The strikes were precise but they do not deliver a comprehensive Syria policy.

The U.S. strikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities have delivered the Assad regime a strong message but a very narrow one. Assad can continue to attack the Syrian people with conventional weapons without fear for the end of his rule. The U.S. military leaders have reaffirmed their long-standing focus on Daesh, thereby clarifying under what specific circumstances the regime would face punitive measures. It has been abundantly clear now that the U.S. would not apply military force to tilt the balance in the Syrian Civil War and these strikes just confirmed that policy once again. Strikes come at a time when the Trump administration has been giving mixed signals about its intentions in Syria.

The military attacks have come in the wake of President Trump’s remarks about getting out of Syria very soon. Many have questioned the wisdom of getting out too soon and leaving the playing field to Russia and Iran. The U.S. military leaders were some of the most immediate opponents of an “immature” military pullout of Syria. The military strikes on the Assad regime seem to ensure that the U.S. will stay in Syria for the foreseeable future. Yet, we need to remember that the precise message of the strikes is not about U.S. presence in Syria but about the use of chemical weapons. The U.S. does not have to be militarily present in Syria to punish the Assad regime thanks to its missile capabilities that we have seen in the attacks over the weekend.

U.S. military leaders have referred to Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution asserting the President’s, as the Commander in Chief, authority to use force for vital national interests. Defining the deterrence and proliferation of chemical weapons as a vital U.S. national interest has an implication that the U.S. will have to enforce this red line in all future violations. This justification steers clear of the war powers debate that has been taking place in some circles, although Congress does not seem to be interested in pushing the President to obtain a new resolution for war in Syria.

The assertion of inherent presidential authority to conduct strikes while relying on the 2001 AUMF in the fight against Daesh seems to emanate from multiple goals defined as national interests by the U.S. leadership. These goals are not always compatible and require different and at times conflicting strategies. While the President seems to think the fight against Daesh is largely completed and that it is time for a pullout, the U.S. response to the use of chemical weapons promises a long-term commitment to the enforcement of the red line. The debate ahead will likely revolve around the lack of an overarching Syria policy that reconciles these tendencies and clarifies the main goal.

The lack (some would argue ambiguity) of a coherent Syria policy has direct consequences for the course of the civil war. The narrow focus on Daesh is combined with a narrow focus on the use of chemical weapons (arguably sarin but not chlorine), which clarifies two priorities but do not add up to a broad policy. This sends the message to the regime that it can survive if it plays by the rules. The tough rhetoric against Iran and Russia does not add up to a broader message about the Syrian Civil War’s endgame. It only tells them that they can continue to support the regime as long as they do not interfere with specific U.S. priorities. President Trump has also given the message that he wants a U.S. pullout of Syria. Multiple priorities and conflicting rhetoric as such promise the continuation of an incoherent U.S. policy in the Middle East. The strikes were precise but they do not deliver a comprehensive Syria policy.

This article was first published by New Turkey on April 10, 2018.

The international community has reassured Assad that he may be punished for it but using chemical weapons will not spell the end of his regime. There are no signs it will be different this time around.

Assad is at it again. His regime used chemical weapons against civilians in Eastern Ghouta, which has been under attack for weeks. It was about a year ago that Assad used chemical weapons to which President Trump responded with a limited military strike. It was more of a show of force than a shift in policy. Since then, the Trump administration largely continued the Obama administration’s policy in Syria. The administration has continued to focus exclusively on Daesh at the expense of changing the equation in the broader civil war.

The most recent Trump announcement to withdraw from Syria “very soon” appears to have more to do with the domestic public opinion than with creating a new Syria policy. The latest attack in Eastern Ghouta may trigger a military response but it will likely remain limited again and keep the Assad regime in place without creating a new Syria policy. As both Obama and Trump said it in their own way, Syria is ultimately “someone else’s problem” for the U.S. Nor is the American public interested in getting involved in Syria any more than they have already. Ahead of the November midterm elections, President Trump might be interested in another show of strength by punishing Assad without deeper involvement in Syria. And Assad knows this.

The Syrian Civil War is entering its eighth year and the Assad regime has used chemical weapons on multiple occasions without serious consequences. It has gotten away with murder with the backing of Russia and Iran. Yet, the U.S. preferred to play the blame game during the Obama administration. Despite the limited military strikes of last year, the Trump administration is displaying a familiar pattern of blaming Russia and Iran but refusing to provide international leadership to bring an end to the conflict. Taking a lead in Syria would require a lot of political and diplomatic investment in a war which the administration considers someone else’s problem. Russia and Iran are too deeply involved to give up now while the U.S., alongside Europe are unwilling to play a big role. Assad is acutely aware of the failures of the international community.

Both President Trump’s harsh rhetoric (his first direct criticism of the Russian President Putin for supporting Assad) and the French President Macron’s red line statement make it likely that there will be a military response. In fact, the readout of a phone call on Sunday between Trump and Macron mentioned an agreement to “coordinate a strong joint response.” Both leaders can show the Assad regime that they will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons but it has become largely irrelevant for Assad as long as the military response remains limited, narrowly designed not to upset the balance of power on the ground. There is no serious indication that it will be different this time around.

One of the central dilemmas since the beginning of the Syrian civil war has been that the Assad regime has been able to use international indecision and disagreements to its advantage. In its weakest moments, the regime benefited from Russian and Iranian support even at the expense of Syria sovereignty. Facilitating the growth of terror groups at the expense of legitimate opposition, the Assad regime has also helped to turn the attention away from itself. All of this was not out of the regime’s genius but due to its repeated attempts at testing the limits of the Western responses towards the atrocities. The international community has reassured Assad that he may be punished for it but using chemical weapons will not spell the end of his regime. There are no signs it will be different this time around.

This article was first published by New Turkey on April 3, 2018.

During the campaign, Trump had benefited immensely from his tough talk on Daesh while criticizing the Iraq war (albeit belatedly). His latest announcement about getting out of Syria is reminiscent of his predecessor’s approach as well as a reflection of the American public’s non-interventionist inclination.

It was only in January when former Secretary of State Tillerson announced a Syria policy with several goals (ensuring no return of Daesh, countering Iran, and the return of refugees) but with no clear strategy to achieve them. President Trump made his views known at least partially by removing Tillerson not long afterward. Following the Pompoe and Bolton appointments, President Trump just announced last week that the U.S. would pull out of Syria “very soon.” Tillerson’s policy announcement had suggested an open-ended U.S. military commitment in Syria but Trump’s statement refers back to his campaign rhetoric that promised overwhelming firepower against Daesh yet saw Syria as somebody else’s problem.

Ironically, the Obama administration had refused to intervene in Syria early in the conflict until the emergence of Daesh, to which it responded with a policy of supporting “local partners” such as the YPG in northern Syria. Trump continued this policy because he wanted to declare victory against Daesh but has not created a major initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis. Trump did not seem to mind that Russia and other regional powers like Turkey took the lead in the diplomatic track. While U.S. military leaders and diplomats criticized Turkey’s most recent Afrin operation, President Trump himself avoided any public comments on the issue. Clearly, this policy disconnect between the White House, Pentagon and the State Department is partially responsible for these differences but it is also because Trump is not committed to Syria for the long haul.

If he follows through with his promise despite grumblings from U.S. military leaders on the ground about the lack of strategy and an early withdrawal, President Trump will actually be more in line with the public opinion that does not see the Syrian civil war as America’s problem but is willing to tolerate a campaign against Daesh without a long-term commitment. Many foreign policy analysts have questioned the wisdom of withdrawing from Iraq prematurely and not intervening in Syria early in the conflict. However, it seems that the somewhat conflicted American public opinion that sees a need in fighting Daesh but is against serious military commitments in the Middle East wins the day for both Presidents Obama and Trump.

Of course, geopolitics and strategic interests have a way of undermining the weight of public opinion and presidents often prioritize national interests, which they sometimes have the luxury of defining. Both Obama and Trump defined defeating Daesh as national interest but Syria’s stability was not a core U.S. interest. During the campaign, Trump had benefited immensely from his tough talk on Daesh while criticizing the Iraq war (albeit belatedly). His latest announcement about getting out of Syria is reminiscent of his predecessor’s approach as well as a reflection of the American public’s non-interventionist inclination.

It remains to be seen whether, when and how Trump may be able to end U.S. military presence in Syria. For this to happen, the Trump administration would have to define what the primary U.S. national interest in the region is. For the new comers to his administration, the answer is Iran and they may argue that being in Syria is essential to countering Iran among other goals. On Iran, Trump will likely pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal but it is not clear whether the administration will seek to create a comprehensive policy to counter or contain Iran. It may just be that Trump orders U.S. troops out of Syria without a larger Syria policy. Similarly, he might pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal without an Iran policy in place. This would mean more uncertainty for the region. This would also mean the continuation of the weakening U.S. leadership in the Middle East trend but it may just be what Trump would label as “America First.” And perhaps, that’s what many Americans want.