This article was originally published by The New Turkey on September 12, 2018.

With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy.

Turkey has been the most vocal critic of the seemingly impending military assault against Idlib by the Assad regime. Turkey has serious concerns about the strategic and humanitarian consequences of a potential operation. An Assad-Iran ground operation supported by Russian airpower (though limited it may be) can unleash yet another humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees. A regime takeover would signal the end of the opposition as we know it. However, Turkey’s adamant stance combined with its recent military reinforcements to the 12 observation posts might bear fruit and deter the regime, at least for the time being. Given the strong rhetoric used by the U.S. against the Assad regime especially with regard to its potential chemical weapons use, Russia might not be so eager to deploy its air support to the regime any time soon.

The most recent Tehran summit that brought the main sponsors of the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran, demonstrated the level of deep disagreements between these powers. While Ankara has pushed for better relations with Moscow recently, the summit showed that Turkey would stand its ground when it comes to defending its interests in Syria, including the support for the moderate opposition. Turkey has not contended itself with warnings about a possible disaster in Idlib but has taken measures to deter the Assad regime from engineering a fait accompli. Clearly, a regime assault on Idlib goes against the basic logic of the Astana process and it can seriously derail any attempt at a political solution.

The Assad regime and its supporters have shown time and again that they have little interest in a truly political process to end the conflict in Syria. The regime has been trying to “win” through a systematic effort to take over most of the country by implementing strategic ceasefires and military operations both sequentially and simultaneously depending on the region. While there has been the talk of a political process, there has been little tangible progress on that front. Turkey’s military presence on the ground and its continued support to the opposition appear to be the only true obstacles before the regime to accomplish its goals. Turkey, on the other, is trying hard to ensure that when and if the Geneva process happens, it comes to the table with a strong hand and a viable opposition to speak of.

The most recent reports indicate that there has been a quiet policy shift in U.S. policy. Having justified its military operations in the north of Syria on the Daesh threat, the U.S. political and military leaders have not been making a strong case for continued operations in Syria, albeit until recently. The recent shift seems to entail a more open-ended commitment despite President Trump’s earlier comments about leaving Syria soon. Now, the Syria policy appears to be insistent on the departure of Iranian forces from the country as well as a stronger, albeit rhetorical, posture against the Assad regime’s potential Idlib operation. It is difficult to say the U.S. and Turkey see eye-to-eye on Idlib but there are clearly strong overlaps.

A realignment could re-emerge between the U.S. and Turkey’s policies on Idlib, which could give the Assad regime and especially Russia a pause. Despite the diplomatic benefits the U.S. position may provide, Turkey has skin in the game in a way its NATO ally does not. With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy. However, there is every indication that the U.S.’s continued support for the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK, will continue. In fact, much of the new Syria policy might depend on this relationship. If that continues to be the case, the U.S.-Turkey agreement on Idlib may not grow into broader cooperation on Syria.

A key component of the new U.S. policy on Syria will be the focus on reducing Iranian influence in the region, hoping to enlist Turkey’s support. However, with the impending sanctions on Iranian energy sectors, it is safe to bet that the U.S. and Turkey will have serious disagreements on Iran. Turkey vehemently disagrees with Iran on Syria but it is reliant on Iran for its oil and natural gas needs. If the U.S. is interested in enlisting Turkish support against Iran’s regional influence, it will need to engage Turkey in a meaningful way beyond the somewhat limited agreement on Idlib.

This article was first published by The New Turkey on September 5, 2018.

The Syrian Civil War, which has been raging for more than seven years, is entering a new phase, as the Assad regime is threatening to take over Idlib with Russian air support. This may very well be the end of the opposition as we know it since Idlib remains the last opposition stronghold.

The Syrian Civil War, which has been raging for more than seven years, is entering a new phase, as the Assad regime is threatening to take over Idlib with Russian air support. This may very well be the end of the opposition as we know it since Idlib remains the last opposition stronghold. The Assad regime and Russia are making a case about the insertion of extremist elements to the city, conveniently ignoring the millions of IDPs that came to the region following the fall of Aleppo and other areas to the regime. In this phase of the conflict, the regime will seek to take the city at any cost, hoping to declare victory in the ravaged country. Once that happens, Russia will be able to argue that now is the time for the political process to move forward and reconstruction efforts to start. All this will happen at a huge civilian costs.

In many ways, Idlib has become a refuge not only for civilians but for opposition forces that have lacked serious support from outside, except for Turkey. The insertion of al-Qaeda affiliates, such as the HTS, into the region has helped the Assad regime to justify a military operation just like it has done in the rest of Syria. It’s a familiar pattern after all when the regime turns a blind eye to the movement of such groups at the beginning only to use them as justification for further military operations down the road. The international community has largely watched this pattern unfold over and over again, except for when the refugee outflows threatened Europe’s stability. It has not only failed to help the opposition but also delivered a message to the Assad regime that it can create humanitarian catastrophes with little, if any, cost.

With the latest news of Russian air bombardment and the potential operation of regime forces to the city, Turkey is ever more nervous about the humanitarian costs and the possible breakdown of the deconfliction zone it has helped to create. Turkey’s first preference was to work with its NATO ally, the U.S. to empower the opposition for a lasting political deal in Syria. Disillusioned with U.S. policy, however, Turkey has increased its diplomatic efforts toward the two major players on the ground, Russia and Iran, through the Astana and Sochi processes. An important result of significant value for Turkish strategic interests has been the creation of deconfliction zones. Turkey’s intervention to contain the PYD/PKK’s march toward the west was also not opposed by Russia and Iran.

The Assad regime’s impending Idlib operation carries the risk of alienation of Turkey from this diplomatic process, not to mention the potential confrontation between Turkish forces and the regime forces. If the Assad regime conducts an all-out assault on Idlib, Turkey will be hard pressed to protect its interests: maintaining the deconfliction zone, stemming the refugee outflows, containing the PYD/PKK, and continuing to engage with Russia and Iran diplomatically. If the opposition loses its control in Idlib to the regime, there may not be much of a need for a diplomatic process anyway. If and when the regime declares victory, Russia will try to pivot quickly to a debate on reconstruction rather than a political solution. Given the complexities of security and political interests of all political actors, it is difficult to imagine either a meaningful reconstruction effort or a sustainable political agreement will emerge any time soon. Under these conditions, Syria will not be stable for a long time to come regardless of what happens in Idlib.

This article was first published by The New Turkey on August 28, 2018.

Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

Turkey has been taking direct action in northwestern Syria in order to protect a variety of significant interests for several years now. Since March, Ankara has been working to build camps with a capacity to host 170,000 refugees inside Syria so to stem the refugee inflows in the event of a major operation by the regime against Idlib. The potential for a fresh round of mass exodus is increasing as the Assad regime appears to plan to capture the last remaining bastion of opposition by justifying it on the presence of al-Qaeda linked groups in the area. The Assad regime’s past practice has shown that it will not spare civilians in the event of a military operation and that it will almost certainly create hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Having warned the regime against a possible operation, Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran for a while now to prevent such a scenario.

There may be a real danger of escalation and risk of conflict with Turkish troops on the ground, which have been deployed to the region to create a de-confliction zone – not to mention millions of IDPs, if the Assad regime attacks Idlib. Turkey is now a major stakeholder in what happens in northwestern Syria, including much of Idlib. The region’s future has a bearing on the fate of the opposition supported by Turkey, the success of the de-confliction zones, and whether the Assad regime can make a long-lasting deal with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK. A regime offensive in the area would produce a new era of instability, potentially disturbing the hard-earned stability thanks to Turkey’s investment on the ground and diplomatic work with Russia and Iran.

Turkey has handled the humanitarian situation admirably over the years but this does not mean it was cost-free either economically or politically. Turkey spent billions of dollars in hosting refugees and it has evolved to be a rather politically sensitive issue domestically. The Turkish administration has been advocating for the creation of stable zones in Syria so that significant numbers of refugees are given the possibility of returning to their homelands. It is not clear whether all refugees in Turkey will be able to, or are willing to, return. However, the fact that close to a quarter a million Syrians have returned is already good news for Turkey. Yet, if the regime repeats what it has done in other parts of Syria by inflicting senseless violence and damage in Idlib, Turkey will be hard-pressed to prevent millions from marching to the Turkish border and to protect its other strategic interests.

What happens in Idlib may spell the end of the Syrian Civil War at a catastrophic cost in human lives and humanitarian challenges. The regime clearly intends to declare victory by taking over Idlib even if it has to create yet another major humanitarian disaster. Russia and Iran have been the critical players on the ground with an indecisive American presence focused on Daesh. The U.S.-backed YPG is now striking a deal with the Assad regime, once again refusing to understand the realities of the region and Turkey’s determination. The Trump administration is not interested in a robust strategic presence in Syria despite arguments for it in order to contain Iran’s influence. Lacking a serious rationale for being in northern Syria other than preventing a potential comeback by Daesh, the U.S. commitment will be increasingly weakened.

Given these dynamics, Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

This article was first published by The New Turkey on August 14, 2018.

President Trump’s domestic agenda has driven the foreign policy agenda while he makes little effort to synthesize the two. In this sense, “America First” has come to mean undermining America’s alliances if it served the administration’s domestic political agenda.

Turkey-U.S. relations are at a new low and it should not come as surprise to anyone that Trumpian foreign policymaking has a lot to do with it. It was less than a month ago that President Trump snubbed most European leaders in a NATO summit in Brussels and seemed to have a warm relationship with President Erdogan, symbolized by the now famous fist bump.

Yet within a month, Trump has given Turkey an ultimatum over the Brunson case, clearly trying to satisfy his Evangelical supporters. As Erdogan refused to bow down to such pressure, Trump announced the doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum that had been imposed earlier this year. Trump was not only impatient with the legal process but also bypassed diplomatic talks between Ankara and Washington, which were designed to resolve the outstanding legal issues between the two countries. As a result, the Turkey-U.S. relationship has become the latest victim of Trumpian foreign policymaking.

This is not the first time that the President has attacked an ally with an eye to retain or increase domestic support on a given issue. Trump attacked Mexico based on his immigration agenda while imposing tariffs on Canada as a result of his economic agenda at home. He threatened to impose tariffs on European imports, which seems to be on hold for the moment after European leaders convinced Trump to work on a new trade agreement.

Trump continues to threaten allies with sanctions for doing business with Iran based on his campaign promise to rip apart the Iran deal, which he did. In all of these instances, President Trump’s domestic agenda has driven the foreign policy agenda while he makes little effort to synthesize the two. In this sense, “America First” has come to mean undermining America’s alliances if it served the administration’s domestic political agenda.

Similarly, President Trump has questioned the very institutions that the U.S. has helped build since the start of the Cold War, including NATO – undermining perhaps the most important institution for U.S. global leadership. Trump’s relentless attacks on NATO were meant to serve his nationalist domestic agenda. The reduction of the debate on NATO’s global role and mission to a budgetary matter, often expressed in terms of financial contributions of member states, was a message to the domestic audience that the U.S. would insist on everybody paying their “fair share.” This message could resonate with a constituency sensitive to government spending and skeptical of the U.S.’ global role. It also sends a message that international organizations are there to serve, first and foremost, U.S. interests rather than sustaining an international system.

Trumpian foreign policy will have long-lasting implications for the global system as well as America’s alliances with countries like Turkey. Turkey is already faced with monumental challenges emanating from the regional instability caused by civil wars in Iraq and Syria. Turkey has also been a strong advocate of international institutions like the UN and NATO assuming larger responsibilities to achieve stability in the region. The U.S., however, chose a unilateralist path under Trump, eroding the effectiveness of multilateral institutions.

Despite these realities, Turkey was working with the U.S. in order to find a resolution to outstanding legal issues between the two countries through diplomatic channels. But the Trump administration’s sanctions and tariffs on Turkey, motivated by domestic political calculations, make it impossible to repair the relationship in the short term.

Trumpian foreign policy will continue to damage U.S. credibility and standing within its allies as well as its competitors. While U.S. allies like Europe and Turkey are going to struggle to effectively address these challenges, they are unlikely to simply roll over. The clear message from the Turkish leadership in the latest currency crisis was that Turkey would not give in to unreasonable demands. Clearly, this is not a desirable state of affairs between two NATO allies, but it is the reality of a new era in which the U.S. government does not hesitate to punish its allies and undermine the very institutions it helped build over decades. Even if the Turkey-U.S. relationship is somehow put back on track, Trumpian foreign policy will continue to introduce much instability into the international system for the foreseeable future.

This article was first published at The New Turkey on August 7, 2018.

Finding a comprehensive solution to the standoff with Iran would remove a significant source of tension from the region but it will probably not be possible in the short and medium terms, barring a major reversal by President Trump or the Iranian regime. In the meantime, both Europe and Turkey will have to figure out a way to work with a unilateralist U.S. administration in order to protect their economic interests as well as energy needs.

The U.S. withdrawal of the Iran nuclear deal and the fresh round of sanctions imposed on Monday present a test to U.S. allies including Europe and Turkey. President Trump campaigned on getting rid of the “worst deal” ever, pulled out of the agreement, imposed sanctions on Iran and promised to isolate the country despite warnings by European allies as well as Turkey. Although President Trump made a rhetorical gesture to Iran’s President Rouhani about meeting face-to-face without preconditions, the U.S. is set to ratchet up the pressure and seek to isolate Iran ahead of the November elections. If anything is clear, Europe is less than thrilled about having to cooperate with the U.S. and states like Russia, China, and India will most likely continue to do business with Iran. Under these conditions, a renewed U.S.-Iran standoff in the coming months might have serious consequences not only for the region but for U.S. allies as well.

European leaders have already expressed their dismay with the Trump administration’s decision to re-impose sanctions underlining that the deal had been working. Furthermore, they are working on providing legislative cover for those businesses adversely affected by U.S. action. The U.S. leadership has been touting Iran’s growing economic problems as part of the success of their pressure campaign but the Iranian regime survived heavy international pressure before. When it finally came to the negotiating table to make the 2015 deal, there was a broad unity among the P5+1 powers and others. The Trump administration’s unilateralist approach will, in all likelihood, be even less effective in isolating Iran and more punishing against U.S. allies.

The Trump administration says it is open to making a more comprehensive deal but declines to take the lead on forging a framework and doing the diplomatic heavy lifting. In the absence of such leadership, Europe will likely limit itself to protecting the financial interests of European companies but will not be able to produce a comprehensive deal. It is doubtful if it can save the Iran deal in any meaningful way. The element of surprise is a signature feature of the Trump presidency as we have seen the President declare his willingness to work toward no trade barriers with the EU. Yet, on Iran, he will most likely pursue a hardline policy until he can declare some sort of “victory.” This dynamic in the wake of November elections makes it almost certain that we will witness increased pressure on Iran and heightened regional tensions.

If the U.S. makes good on its promise to actually start penalizing companies doing business with Iran, Europe, as well as Turkey, will find themselves in a difficult position. Turkey relies on Russia and Iran for most of its energy needs and it cannot easily give up on especially Iranian natural gas. The Obama administration provided Turkey with waivers but doing business with Iran continued to be a significant source of tension in the bilateral relationship. It is not clear whether the White House will be willing to provide exemptions to Turkey but President Erdogan already indicated Turkey’s energy needs as his first priority on this issue. The Trump administration’s unprecedented sanctions on a NATO ally have already severely strained the Turkey-U.S. relationship and additional penalties imposed on Turkish entities for facilitating trade with Iran would deepen the divide, potentially setting the bilateral ties on a course of complete breakdown. Let us hope that the most recent talks between the two sides on the Iran sanctions produce tangible results and that they are not reversed by hasty decisions.

Finding a comprehensive solution to the standoff with Iran would remove a significant source of tension from the region but it will probably not be possible in the short and medium terms, barring a major reversal by President Trump or the Iranian regime. In the meantime, both Europe and Turkey will have to figure out a way to work with a unilateralist U.S. administration in order to protect their economic interests as well as energy needs. The already troubled Turkey-U.S. ties, however, will almost certainly experience the most duress as a result.

This article was first published at The New Turkey on July 30, 2018.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is faced with yet another crisis, this time over the Brunson case. Crises are increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception largely because of the underlying strategic dissonance between the two NATO allies. The U.S. and Turkey continue to fundamentally diverge over the PYD’s position in northern Syria, the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400s, and arms transfers. The legal cases such as the Gulen extradition, the Halkbank case, and the Brunson case further deepen the existing discord. Added to this picture, the Trump administration’s domestic political troubles are pushing the relationship to the brink.

In the latest episode, Vice President Pence’s need to satisfy the demands of his evangelical constituency ahead of the November elections seems to override the need to engage Turkey rather than punish it. Pence’s harsh rhetoric was matched by President Trump’s social media message on the matter, which was clearly coordinated. As with many other foreign policy issues, President Trump used harsh rhetoric despite the welcome progress underlined by high level administration officials such as the Secretary of State Pompeo just days earlier. There is a chance diplomatic channels may produce a result acceptable to both sides on the Brunson case, but the ultimatum-like rhetoric used against Turkey would only make it harder to arrive at a political understanding, if any.

The ongoing efforts in the U.S. Congress to block the transfer of F-35s to Turkey indicates the detrimental effect of domestic political calculations on foreign policy. Congress has asked the Pentagon to provide a report evaluating the implications of Turkey’s potential purchase of Russian S-400s. Lawmakers cited the Brunson case to justify this move but the potential blockade of the transfer of the planes would hurt the very strategic partnership that the F-35 project is supposed to strengthen. President Erdogan has already pointed to international arbitration in case of such a move, which would only cause delays in the program and further damage the U.S.-Turkey security partnership.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship certainly has the capacity to overcome this latest crisis but a lot more effort is required to put it on the right track. Both sides had been avoiding public statements that would damage the ongoing working groups for a while now. But the most recent spat shows that domestic political considerations can be spoilers and it is crucially important to prevent such mishaps. The Turkish public continues to be deeply distrustful of the U.S. and the American public opinion is shaped by negative media coverage as well. Turkish politicians have made a serious effort to work with the Trump administration on all problem areas through various proposals and mechanisms to resolve problems but it is clear they will not respond well to sanction threats. The U.S. leaders need to give time and space to diplomatic channels instead of issuing counterproductive threats.

President Trump’s style of raising the stakes in order to secure a deal that benefits the U.S. seems to be at work here. However, raising the stakes based on domestic political calculations and adopting a maximalist approach cannot provide solutions in an already troubled relationship. The U.S. support for the PYD was already a move that was unilateral in its approach despite assurances provided to Turkey. Now, if the Trump administration goes down the road of unilateralism seeking to force Turkey’s hand, the relationship will only suffer damaging the national interest of both allies. The U.S.-Turkey relationship can hopefully overcome this latest crisis but we will almost certainly see more crises in the future given the instability and unpredictability in the region as well as the increasing insecurity and distrust among NATO allies.