This article was first published by Daily Sabah on March 28, 2014.

The crisis in Ukraine coincided with a domestic political crisis in Turkey and the run-up to local elections at the end of March. As a NATO member, Turkey responded to the crisis by oppos- ing Crimea’s break-away from Ukraine and aligning itself with its Western allies. In the face of Russia’s imminent annexation of Crimea, Turkey joined the U.S. and the EU in announcing that it will not recognize the referendum as legiti- mate. Turkey’s priorities in the Ukrainian crisis are the country’s territorial integrity, the prevention of regional instability, and the safety and security of Crimean Tatars. Russia’s actions threaten all of these priorities and should Russia expand its reach into Ukraine, Turkish-Russian relations will be further damaged.

Russian President Putin does not show any sign of yielding to Western pressure and he will likely succeed in yet another fait accompli as he did in Georgia in 2008. The fear is that Russia will not be satisfied with Crimea’s annexation, but will go further into Ukraine and beyond in an attempt to resurrect the Russian Empire. The majority of the Western measures taken or planned thus far are unlikely to dissuade Russia, as the EU’s energy dependency on Russia renders Western pressure ineffective. Turkey’s leverage over Russia is limited and its energy dependency (like much of Europe) is an obstacle preventing Ankara from applying serious pressure. It seems unlikely that Turkey will announce sanctions against Moscow as this would endanger its energy security and trade ties with Russia. However, Turkey will likely join its Western partners in making Crimea’s annexation costly for Russia. At the same time, in the long run Turkey may have to compartmentalize its disagreement with Russia – as it did with Syria – in order to avoid negative economic repercussions.

Turkey’s concern for the Crimean Tatars is an important component of Turkish policy towards Ukraine because of Turkey’s historic ties with the Tatars. In fact, the loss of Crimea in the late 18th century was a devastating strategic loss and a psychological trauma for the Ottomans.

For the first time, the Ottomans lost a Muslim-majority territory after disastrous defeats suffered at the hands of the Russians. Crimea’s independence marked a turning point for the Ottomans, as their retreat against the Russians throughout the 18th century became definitive. Much has changed since then and the demographic balance is not the same, as Tatars constitute close to 15 percent of the Crimean population. In addition to historic ties to the region, the Tatar diaspora in Turkey makes the wellbeing of Crimean Tatars a serious concern for Ankara. Turkey will likely lobby Moscow to ensure their safety, even though it will not recognize the annexation of Crimea. If the situation deteriorates and the Tatars are further threatened, Turkey will be hard pressed to take a harder line against Russia.

The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 led Europe to seek ways of diversifying its energy sources. Turkey benefited from the crisis, as it emerged as an im- portant energy transit route for Europe. With the current crisis, this interest in energy diversification will likely reemerge. However, if this side benefit comes at the expense of good relations with Russia, it will not be a real win for Turkey. The potential for regional instability makes it critical for Turkey that the situation does not deteriorate. If the crisis escalates and leads to a military standoff between NATO and Russia, Turkey will be directly affected and have to make difficult choices, such as allowing U.S. destroyers to cross into the Black Sea through the Turkish straits.

Any escalation will not only lead to regional instability but also a deterioration of Turkish-Russian relations. If Russia continues to expand its reach into Ukraine, the West may decide to isolate Russia. In that case, Turkey would have to align itself with its Western allies in containing Russia’s actions. While we should not expect Turkish policy to be more hardline than that of the West, Turkey cannot afford to be a bystander and merely hope for the best in Ukraine.

This article was first published in Daily Sabah on February 28, 2014.

The international community will have to address Iran’s role in the Syrian conflict one way or another and a truly lasting resolution will depend on Tehran’s behavior as much as that of the Assad regime

The failure of the Geneva II conference has demonstrated once again that the main stakeholders in the Syrian conflict have entirely opposing views of the crisis. Fundamental disagreements over the basic nature of the conflict and how the opposition and the Syrian government view their positions give little, if any, hope of a potential resolution any time soon. The opposition insists on a transitional government, while the regime remains intransigent on its view of the conflict as one between the Syrian government and terrorist groups.

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If any future negotiations are to succeed, the international community must be willing to back the talks with a credible use of force.

It came as little surprise to most observers that the first round of peace talks between the Syrian regime and opposition, dubbed Geneva II, ended with no substantive progress. The conference did little to narrow the gap between the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the opposition, led by Syrian National Coalition (SNC) chairman Ahmad Asi Al-Jarba. The conference was full of hostile speeches and inflammatory rhetoric. Important players were missing and Assad’s delegation displayed unwillingness to compromise. However, the Syrian conflict, which has claimed over 130,000 lives, internally displaced 6.5 million people, and forced 2.4 million Syrians to flee the country, cannot be solved by anything other than a political solution. The international community must back a peace deal that forms a transitional government based on respect for democracy, human rights and liberties. Global actors must be prepared to use credible threats to pressure the regime to discuss a transitional body and ensure that a settlement is respected.

Failure of Geneva II

Expectations of a breakthrough were very low on the eve of the Geneva II peace conference, as the regime and the opposition would sit at the negotiating table for the first time. Until the last minute, participation of the regime and Iran in the conference remained a contentious issue. The basic framework of the conference also remained murky. With the exception of the Syrian regime’s delegation, all 30 nations that attended the conference signed the Geneva I protocol and agreed to the goal of creating a transitional government based on “mutual consent” with “full executive powers.” Although a final transitional government was the ultimate goal, the focus quickly shifted to “confidence building measures,” specifically local ceasefires, prisoner exchanges and allowing access to humanitarian aid, particularly in the besieged city of Homs. Despite direct talks between the delegates of the Assad regime and opposition, the conference ended with minimal, if any, progress.

The conference was characterized by a disagreement on whether to focus on the transitional process or “terrorism” issues. Several scheduled meetings were postponed or canceled due to the regime’s reluctance to discuss a transitional body. Rather than agreeing to the Geneva I protocol, Assad’s delegation introduced a “declaration of principles” that aimed to preserve state institutions and combat the threat from “terrorist” groups. Unsurprisingly, the SNC delegation rejected the declaration, accusing the regime delegates of “derailing talks and straying from the Geneva II Communique.” While “a positive step forward” was declared after the government’s delegation agreed to use the Geneva I protocol as the basis for the talks, both sides maintain extremely different interpretations of a “political transition” and the regime continued to insist that the first topic discussed should be the fight against “terrorism.”

The conflicting agendas of the two warring sides left little room for negotiation. The only result of 10 days of talks was the regime’s offer to allow women and children to leave a blockaded area of Homs. The proposal raised many objections, as Western diplomats insisted that evacuation is not an alternative to allowing humanitarian aid and threatened to challenge the regime in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) if aid delivery was not permitted soon. At the end, there was no resolution on the humanitarian issue in Homs or even the evacuation of civilians. There are very few indications that the next round of negotiations will overcome the deeply conflicting perspectives on the ultimate goal of the negotiations.

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As a component of the YSOT program, SETA publishes this edited volume on Turkish foreign policy with articles presented at the YSOT conference.

The YSOT program was designed to serve as a bridge between academic research and policy debates on Turkey, and to contribute to discussions, specifically in the Washington DC policy community, by drawing on already accumulated academic knowledge. Early career scholars’ new research and fresh perspectives have rendered this program unique in many ways. As “young” scholars find it an opportunity as well as a challenge to present their work to the policy community, policy “analysts” find it truly enriching to hear from scholars visiting from around the globe. For us at SETA, it is both a challenging and rewarding experience to bring these two communities together, particularly to discuss Turkish foreign policy. We believe in the value of this endeavor and aim to continue this program in the future.

The first YSOT conference in April 2011 resulted in a volume titled History, Politics, and Foreign Policy in Turkey, edited by Kilic Bugra Kanat, Nuh Yilmaz, and Kadir Ustun and published by the SETA Foundation. We have once again opted to work on an edited volume, rather than publish the proceedings of the 2013 YSOT conference.

The current volume is organized into two parts. The first part – “Turkish Foreign Policy and US-Turkey Relations” – begins with an introductory chapter titled , “Theorizing the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy.” Within, Kilic Bugra Kanat presents a thoughtful consideration of the structural changes in Turkish foreign policymaking over the past decade, those which are often missed in Turkish foreign policy debates. Kanat carefully considers the relationship between the end of an international system and its impact on Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. By examining the discussions from the perspective of the global international system and post-Cold War US foreign policy, the chapter situates Turkey’s emergence as a regional actor within a broader context that addresses the relationships between a great power – such as the US – and a regional power – such as Turkey – in a unipolar world. On the domestic front, Kanat identifies significant yet under-discussed transformations. By drawing attention to the increased importance of public opinion and changes in decision-making mechanisms in Turkey, Kanat outlines the domestic dynamics of Turkish foreign policy change. He goes further than simply asserting that many scholars still hold onto Cold War understanding of Turkish foreign policy by identifying specific trends that have propelled the major transformations we have witnessed over the past decade.

The second part of this volume is titled, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” a topic that has been one of the focal points for academics and analysts in the wake of the Arab Spring. Since January 2011, the Middle East has experienced momentous changes with which even the most adaptable and dynamic countries have found it very difficult to keep up. As Turkish foreign policy has identified this period as a historic moment, it has responded to developments in every country that has been influenced by the regional structural changes the Arab Spring has engendered.

In the wake of historic turmoil in the region, Turkey’s foreign policy will continue to be closely followed, especially if the country is able to sustain its economic growth, political stability, and diplomatic activism. Some irreversible and structural changes have already occurred, while some are discussed at length in this volume. These chapters provide us with a strong sense of Turkish foreign policy areas that may adjust in light of residual regional uncertainties and developing conflicts, while also presenting a unique perspective that places emphasis on the impact of regional crises and global transformations. Turkey’s ability to respond to forces that affect its policies will define the limits and the extent of Turkey’s role, both in the Middle East and globally. As such, this volume aims to offer a significant contribution to debates on change and adaptation in Turkish foreign policy.

Get a hardcopy or Kindle edition at Amazon.com.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Editor’s Preface
INTRODUCTION

PART 1 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND US-TURKEY RELATIONS
Theorizing the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy
KILIÇ BUĞRA KANAT
Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Reconsidering the Power Balance Equation
YEVGENIYA GABER
Of Babies and Burlap Bags: Key Moments and the Making of the US Image in Turkey
JOSHUA CARNEY

PART 2 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Turkey’s Role as a Regional Power in the Middle East
SHAIMAA ABDEL FATTAH
Economic Considerations in Turkey’s Foreign PolicyDuring Times of Crises: Responding to the Arab Spring
ALTAY ATLI
Representation of Syrian Exiles in Turkish Media: Foreign Policy and Ideology
NERMİN AYDEMİR

This analysis was published as part of SETA DC Perspective series on January 16, 2014.

What should have normally been treated as a judicial case of corruption allegations turned into a major political crisis because of the timing and the way the investigations were carried out.

Yet another political crisis in Turkey has dominated the headlines since December 2013. What should have normally been treated as a judicial case of corruption allegations turned into a major political crisis because of the timing and the way the investigations were carried out. Few doubt that this was a political move against the government from a network of prosecutors, judges, and police affiliated with the Gulen movement. The overall goal of this move remains unclear but it has done enough damage by implicating the ruling AK Party government in corruption charges ahead of the municipal elections in March 2014 and the presidential elections in June 2014. Whether this will cost the AK Party substantial losses in the upcoming elections remains to be seen but the legacy of the political fallout from this episode will determine the future of democratic conservative politics in Turkey.

On December 17, an Istanbul prosecutor ordered the arrests of businesspeople, relatives of politicians and bureaucrats. The corruption allegations in three separate “secret” investigations were bundled together into an overnight string of arrests. In the government’s view, the investigations were politically motivated and they were timed and packaged in a way to create an outsized effect to embarrass and perhaps to bring down the government. It was troublesome that both the prosecutor and the police chiefs conducting the raids had kept these investigations secret from their immediate superiors for more than a year. The investigations were not posted to the police intranet to avoid oversight and the prosecutor kept the investigation under wraps from the Chief Prosecutor. Moreover, to win over public opinion in the very first hours of the investigation, the police leaked alleged evidence (such as cash being stored in shoeboxes) to media outlets. Similar tactics had been used before, during investigations into the army officers as well as during the match-fixing investigations into the Fenerbahce football club.

In the latest graft probe, instead of acting at the time of the alleged wrongdoings, a network of police chiefs and prosecutors had compiled dossiers on influential figures close to the government for a politically opportune time in the future. When the time was right, these separate investigations were brought together and put to “good use.” The arrests came in the wake of the political fight over the closure of the university exam prep schools, institutions from which the Gulen movement has benefited over the years both financially and in terms of human capital. On the eve of the upcoming municipal elections in March, the ruling party seemed most vulnerable to political scandals. As the Gulen movement failed to force the government into canceling its plans to close down the prep schools (although a modified version of the law delayed it to 2015), the time seemed ripe for an all-out political assault on the Erdogan government.

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Sabah Perspektif, November 2, 2013, Translated by Gülgün Kozan Köse

The disagreement between Turkey and the US on the Syrian issue and the coup d’état in Egypt are contributing factors to increased criticism of Turkey in Washington.

Recent discussions about Turkey in Washington drew a lot of attention from the Turkish public. The latest news on the Turkish intelligence chief came at a time when disagreements between the US and Turkey over Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Israel had deepened and NATO openly voiced its opposition to Turkey’s intention to purchase a missile-defense system from China. The fact that sources from the US government were cited in the news can be considered a sign of general discomfort with Turkey’s policies.

From “Shift of Axis” to “Model Country”

The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident followed by Turkey’s “No” vote on sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council provoked “shift of axis” discussions in Washington. In contrast, in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, Turkey began to be considered a “model country” for the Middle East. These arguments were not completely new but it was strange that such a drastic shift in Turkey debates occurred within a year. In a way, this points to a level of shallowness in these discussions but Turkey’s support for democracy against oppressive regimes during the Arab Spring was the determining factor in the shift over to the “model country” debate.

Turkey’s announcement that it would host NATO radar in the town of Kürecik in the summer of 2011 suddenly ended the “shift of axis” discussion. While Israel flirted with Greece and Cyprus, it did not abandon hope in Turkey. Therefore, the pro-Israel lobby in Washington abstained from launching a systematic campaign against Turkey. The US spent a lot of effort to help reconciliation between Turkey and Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to Turkey on President Obama’s initiative.

Despite the apology from Israel, Turkish-Israeli relations have not been normalized, which poses a problem not only for Obama’s personal prestige but also for his relations with the pro-Israel lobby. Furthermore, this weakens Obama’s hand against Netanyahu who is pushing for an aggressive posture against Iran.

Disagreements over Syria and Egypt

President Obama wants to reduce the US “footprint” in the Middle East and is willing to pay only the most minimum cost possible. Due to the psychological and material cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is extremely cautious about its Syria policy. As the President believes that there is not much to do about the civil war in Syria, his policies are limited to the destruction of chemical weapons, preventing the spillover of the war to neighboring countries and providing minimal support to the opposition. Iran’s recent outreach to the US has the potential to pave the way for Obama to resolve the nuclear crisis and enter into a possible dialogue with Iran on Syria.

Having limited its Syria policy to the destruction of chemical weapons and isolation of al-Qaeda linked groups, the Obama administration is seeking an agreement with Russia through the Geneva II Conference. However, Turkey’s insistence on regime change poses a problem for the Obama administration. In this sense, the widening disagreement between Turkey and the US on Syria is a significant factor contributing to increased criticism of Turkey.

Another factor provoking criticism of Turkey is its attitude towards the coup d’état in Egypt. While Turkey opposed the coup, the US administration preferred to accept the current reality. The Obama administration believes it has a clean enough record on supporting democracy in Egypt, as it accepted the election of Mohammed Morsi as president in the first place and froze certain forms of military aid to the coup administration without calling it a “coup.” Obama’s argument is that he is trying to balance values and US interests but this is not always possible. This balancing act provides us with clues about his approach on Egypt.

Towards a Realistic Relationship

Growing criticisms of Turkey should not be surprising given the disagreements on Israel, Syria and Egypt followed by NATO’s high-level reaction against Turkey’s intention to purchase missile-defense system from a Chinese company. The Abramowitz and Edelman report by the Bipartisan Policy Center offers similar critiques and argues for moving away from the rhetorical debates, such as “model country,” to a more realist approach. A realistic assessment on Turkey in Washington would actually benefit Turkey because neither the “shift of axis” nor the “model country” debates can be said to reflect Turkey’s reality. In any case, if Turkey is indeed claiming to be a great power, we need to get used to it being under the spotlight and receiving harsh criticisms.