This article was first published by New Turkey on May 1, 2018.

President Macron might have convinced Trump to reconsider pulling U.S. troops out of Syria “too soon” but the central disconnect between fighting terrorism and larger strategic goals in the U.S. approach seems beyond a single administration’s preferences.

In his most recent visit to Washington, French President Emmanuel Macron appealed to President Trump to avoid leaving Syria too soon. Trump had already announced that the U.S. would withdraw from Syria “very soon” but U.S. military leaders immediately questioned the wisdom of pulling out. They warned against a premature pullout that would leave the ground to Russia and Iran as well as risk the return of Daesh. In a joint press conference with Macron, President Trump seemed to oscillate between bringing troops home and giving Iran an “open season to the Mediterranean.” In many ways, Trump’s statements summarize the inherent contradictions in U.S. policy in Syria. Ever since the U.S. has defined the defeat of Daesh as its main and increasingly exclusive goal in Syria, it has been unable to articulate a policy that reconciled its strategic goals and the domestic public opinion disfavoring a larger military commitment.

U.S. policy on Syria during the Obama administration suffered from the same contradiction between fighting terrorism and regional strategic goals. Obama emphasized working with local forces in fighting Daesh while prioritized the nuclear deal with Iran. Regularly invoking the danger of mission creep, Obama refused to articulate a comprehensive policy that would require American troop commitment to Syria. Using the PKK’s Syrian branch the YPG, the Obama administration brought great strains to the relationship with Turkey as well. Satisfying the domestic public opinion with a “light footprint” in Syria and striking a nuclear deal with Iran guided Obama’s refusal to commit the U.S. to a leadership role in ending the Syrian civil war.

President Trump benefited during the presidential campaign from a strong critique of the Iraq war and a harsh rhetoric on Daesh. He promised to use overwhelming firepower against Daesh and to avoid any new wars in the Middle East. This approach reflected the U.S. public opinion that agreed with the need to fight terrorism but disagreed with a larger involvement in the Middle East to address that same problem. In many ways, this fundamental contradiction that existed during the Obama administration remains under the Trump administration as well. While it seems straightforward to make the anti-terrorism argument, neither administration seems capable of making a convincing argument to the American public about the need for a comprehensive Middle East policy.

While President Obama sought a nuclear deal with Iran that would eventually lead to the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran, Trump has been adamant about abandoning the deal and pushing back against Iran. Obama made the nuclear deal a centerpiece of his Middle East policy but failed to address the Syrian Civil War, hoping he could somehow compartmentalize it from relations with Iran. The Trump administration has been talking about the “malign influence” of Iran in the region but a comprehensive policy is still lacking. The media reports that President Trump received assurances from his new National Security Advisor Bolton that he would not start new wars. It shows that President Trump is willing to push back against Iran but he wants it to stop short of war, an approach in line with the domestic public opinion.

President Macron might have convinced Trump to reconsider pulling U.S. troops out of Syria “too soon” but the central disconnect between fighting terrorism and larger strategic goals in the U.S. approach seems beyond a single administration’s preferences. The legacy of the Iraq war has had a strong role in the election of both Presidents Obama and Trump. The need to address international terrorism has defined both administrations’ Middle East policies. When it comes to crafting a strategy toward Iran, however, neither has defined a comprehensive vision that has been bought by the American public. It is going to take a lot more creativity than Macron’s advice and warnings to come up with a strategic vision that reconciles the U.S. strategic goals and domestic public opinion.

This article was first published by New Turkey on April 17, 2018.

President Trump has also given the message that he wants a U.S. pullout of Syria. Multiple priorities and conflicting rhetoric promise the continuation of an incoherent U.S. policy in the Middle East. The strikes were precise but they do not deliver a comprehensive Syria policy.

The U.S. strikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities have delivered the Assad regime a strong message but a very narrow one. Assad can continue to attack the Syrian people with conventional weapons without fear for the end of his rule. The U.S. military leaders have reaffirmed their long-standing focus on Daesh, thereby clarifying under what specific circumstances the regime would face punitive measures. It has been abundantly clear now that the U.S. would not apply military force to tilt the balance in the Syrian Civil War and these strikes just confirmed that policy once again. Strikes come at a time when the Trump administration has been giving mixed signals about its intentions in Syria.

The military attacks have come in the wake of President Trump’s remarks about getting out of Syria very soon. Many have questioned the wisdom of getting out too soon and leaving the playing field to Russia and Iran. The U.S. military leaders were some of the most immediate opponents of an “immature” military pullout of Syria. The military strikes on the Assad regime seem to ensure that the U.S. will stay in Syria for the foreseeable future. Yet, we need to remember that the precise message of the strikes is not about U.S. presence in Syria but about the use of chemical weapons. The U.S. does not have to be militarily present in Syria to punish the Assad regime thanks to its missile capabilities that we have seen in the attacks over the weekend.

U.S. military leaders have referred to Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution asserting the President’s, as the Commander in Chief, authority to use force for vital national interests. Defining the deterrence and proliferation of chemical weapons as a vital U.S. national interest has an implication that the U.S. will have to enforce this red line in all future violations. This justification steers clear of the war powers debate that has been taking place in some circles, although Congress does not seem to be interested in pushing the President to obtain a new resolution for war in Syria.

The assertion of inherent presidential authority to conduct strikes while relying on the 2001 AUMF in the fight against Daesh seems to emanate from multiple goals defined as national interests by the U.S. leadership. These goals are not always compatible and require different and at times conflicting strategies. While the President seems to think the fight against Daesh is largely completed and that it is time for a pullout, the U.S. response to the use of chemical weapons promises a long-term commitment to the enforcement of the red line. The debate ahead will likely revolve around the lack of an overarching Syria policy that reconciles these tendencies and clarifies the main goal.

The lack (some would argue ambiguity) of a coherent Syria policy has direct consequences for the course of the civil war. The narrow focus on Daesh is combined with a narrow focus on the use of chemical weapons (arguably sarin but not chlorine), which clarifies two priorities but do not add up to a broad policy. This sends the message to the regime that it can survive if it plays by the rules. The tough rhetoric against Iran and Russia does not add up to a broader message about the Syrian Civil War’s endgame. It only tells them that they can continue to support the regime as long as they do not interfere with specific U.S. priorities. President Trump has also given the message that he wants a U.S. pullout of Syria. Multiple priorities and conflicting rhetoric as such promise the continuation of an incoherent U.S. policy in the Middle East. The strikes were precise but they do not deliver a comprehensive Syria policy.

This article was first published by New Turkey on April 10, 2018.

The international community has reassured Assad that he may be punished for it but using chemical weapons will not spell the end of his regime. There are no signs it will be different this time around.

Assad is at it again. His regime used chemical weapons against civilians in Eastern Ghouta, which has been under attack for weeks. It was about a year ago that Assad used chemical weapons to which President Trump responded with a limited military strike. It was more of a show of force than a shift in policy. Since then, the Trump administration largely continued the Obama administration’s policy in Syria. The administration has continued to focus exclusively on Daesh at the expense of changing the equation in the broader civil war.

The most recent Trump announcement to withdraw from Syria “very soon” appears to have more to do with the domestic public opinion than with creating a new Syria policy. The latest attack in Eastern Ghouta may trigger a military response but it will likely remain limited again and keep the Assad regime in place without creating a new Syria policy. As both Obama and Trump said it in their own way, Syria is ultimately “someone else’s problem” for the U.S. Nor is the American public interested in getting involved in Syria any more than they have already. Ahead of the November midterm elections, President Trump might be interested in another show of strength by punishing Assad without deeper involvement in Syria. And Assad knows this.

The Syrian Civil War is entering its eighth year and the Assad regime has used chemical weapons on multiple occasions without serious consequences. It has gotten away with murder with the backing of Russia and Iran. Yet, the U.S. preferred to play the blame game during the Obama administration. Despite the limited military strikes of last year, the Trump administration is displaying a familiar pattern of blaming Russia and Iran but refusing to provide international leadership to bring an end to the conflict. Taking a lead in Syria would require a lot of political and diplomatic investment in a war which the administration considers someone else’s problem. Russia and Iran are too deeply involved to give up now while the U.S., alongside Europe are unwilling to play a big role. Assad is acutely aware of the failures of the international community.

Both President Trump’s harsh rhetoric (his first direct criticism of the Russian President Putin for supporting Assad) and the French President Macron’s red line statement make it likely that there will be a military response. In fact, the readout of a phone call on Sunday between Trump and Macron mentioned an agreement to “coordinate a strong joint response.” Both leaders can show the Assad regime that they will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons but it has become largely irrelevant for Assad as long as the military response remains limited, narrowly designed not to upset the balance of power on the ground. There is no serious indication that it will be different this time around.

One of the central dilemmas since the beginning of the Syrian civil war has been that the Assad regime has been able to use international indecision and disagreements to its advantage. In its weakest moments, the regime benefited from Russian and Iranian support even at the expense of Syria sovereignty. Facilitating the growth of terror groups at the expense of legitimate opposition, the Assad regime has also helped to turn the attention away from itself. All of this was not out of the regime’s genius but due to its repeated attempts at testing the limits of the Western responses towards the atrocities. The international community has reassured Assad that he may be punished for it but using chemical weapons will not spell the end of his regime. There are no signs it will be different this time around.

This article was first published by New Turkey on April 3, 2018.

During the campaign, Trump had benefited immensely from his tough talk on Daesh while criticizing the Iraq war (albeit belatedly). His latest announcement about getting out of Syria is reminiscent of his predecessor’s approach as well as a reflection of the American public’s non-interventionist inclination.

It was only in January when former Secretary of State Tillerson announced a Syria policy with several goals (ensuring no return of Daesh, countering Iran, and the return of refugees) but with no clear strategy to achieve them. President Trump made his views known at least partially by removing Tillerson not long afterward. Following the Pompoe and Bolton appointments, President Trump just announced last week that the U.S. would pull out of Syria “very soon.” Tillerson’s policy announcement had suggested an open-ended U.S. military commitment in Syria but Trump’s statement refers back to his campaign rhetoric that promised overwhelming firepower against Daesh yet saw Syria as somebody else’s problem.

Ironically, the Obama administration had refused to intervene in Syria early in the conflict until the emergence of Daesh, to which it responded with a policy of supporting “local partners” such as the YPG in northern Syria. Trump continued this policy because he wanted to declare victory against Daesh but has not created a major initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis. Trump did not seem to mind that Russia and other regional powers like Turkey took the lead in the diplomatic track. While U.S. military leaders and diplomats criticized Turkey’s most recent Afrin operation, President Trump himself avoided any public comments on the issue. Clearly, this policy disconnect between the White House, Pentagon and the State Department is partially responsible for these differences but it is also because Trump is not committed to Syria for the long haul.

If he follows through with his promise despite grumblings from U.S. military leaders on the ground about the lack of strategy and an early withdrawal, President Trump will actually be more in line with the public opinion that does not see the Syrian civil war as America’s problem but is willing to tolerate a campaign against Daesh without a long-term commitment. Many foreign policy analysts have questioned the wisdom of withdrawing from Iraq prematurely and not intervening in Syria early in the conflict. However, it seems that the somewhat conflicted American public opinion that sees a need in fighting Daesh but is against serious military commitments in the Middle East wins the day for both Presidents Obama and Trump.

Of course, geopolitics and strategic interests have a way of undermining the weight of public opinion and presidents often prioritize national interests, which they sometimes have the luxury of defining. Both Obama and Trump defined defeating Daesh as national interest but Syria’s stability was not a core U.S. interest. During the campaign, Trump had benefited immensely from his tough talk on Daesh while criticizing the Iraq war (albeit belatedly). His latest announcement about getting out of Syria is reminiscent of his predecessor’s approach as well as a reflection of the American public’s non-interventionist inclination.

It remains to be seen whether, when and how Trump may be able to end U.S. military presence in Syria. For this to happen, the Trump administration would have to define what the primary U.S. national interest in the region is. For the new comers to his administration, the answer is Iran and they may argue that being in Syria is essential to countering Iran among other goals. On Iran, Trump will likely pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal but it is not clear whether the administration will seek to create a comprehensive policy to counter or contain Iran. It may just be that Trump orders U.S. troops out of Syria without a larger Syria policy. Similarly, he might pull the U.S. out of the nuclear deal without an Iran policy in place. This would mean more uncertainty for the region. This would also mean the continuation of the weakening U.S. leadership in the Middle East trend but it may just be what Trump would label as “America First.” And perhaps, that’s what many Americans want.

This article was first published by New Turkey on March 27, 2018.

If the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of will whether they will.

The U.S. and Turkey have been pursuing conflicting strategies in northern Syria for a while now. Turkey adamantly pursued to end the U.S. support for the YPG while the Trump administration has seen the group as its “local partner” in the coalition’s anti-Daesh efforts. Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch has recently ended the YPG’s control over Afrin, a city in which the U.S. has declared no interest but expressed “concern” about the Turkish operation. While Turkey is focused on clearing its borders from the YPG and Daesh, the U.S. is insisting that Turkish military operations distract from the fight against Daesh.

The strategies of the two countries diverge from one another so much that they carry the potential to come head to head in Manbij. However, negotiations in bilateral strategy talks, a mechanism established following the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visits to Turkey, could yield a cooperation deal in Manbij, which could potentially be broadened. In such an optimistic scenario, the anti-Daesh fight would actually be strengthened while Turkey’s security concerns vis-à-vis the YPG could be met. A deal that pushes the YPG back east across the Euphrates and establishes a U.S.-Turkey coordinated patrol of Manbij can be the basis of broadened cooperation in northern Syria.

Today, Turkey is pushing the U.S. to end the YPG control in Manbij, a promise made by Vice President Joe Biden under the Obama administration. The capture of the town was so alarming that Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, only a month after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, in order to prevent further spread of the YPG control in the area. For Turkey, the PKK was trying to accomplish what it could not inside Turkey by creating an autonomous zone in northern Syria through the YPG. By intervening for the first time militarily in Syria, Turkey took the matter into its own hands as multiple U.S. reassurances about the short-term and tactical nature of its support for the YPG did not materialize.

Turkey has been able to change the strategic environment on the ground through its military operations at the expense of both the YPG and Daesh. Clearing its border from both terrorist organizations seems to be its current strategy. The U.S. strategy only partially overlaps with the Turkish strategy but that could be considered as a glass half full. Through an arrangement as described above, diversification of the governing structure of Manbij more representative of the ethnic makeup of the area could be accomplished. U.S.-Turkey military cooperation in patrolling the city can be a trust building measure. Such success in Manbij would not erase the overall strategic differences between the two allies but it would pave way for a broader and meaningful strategic conversation.

The U.S.-Turkey strategic realignment will be very difficult to achieve as the U.S. keeps its exclusive focus on Daesh while ignoring Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG. However, if Manbij can serve as a success story of military and political cooperation on the ground, both Ankara and Washington can build upon it. Regular strategic conversations to coordinate policy are a must between the American and Turkish governments and it can start with Manbij. This is true not only for their Syria policies but other regional issues as well.

As the Trump administration is gearing up to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal, a new era of uncertainty and tensions will likely emerge. President Trump has championed “America first,” a slogan that at times manifested itself as unilateralism in foreign policy. The recent addition of the Pompeo-Bolton duo to the administration promises more unilateralism than multilateralism. The administration will likely find an unwilling Europe to corner Iran, and Turkey is not likely to take a confrontational stand against Iran. Yet, if the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of whether they will.

This article was first published by New Turkey on March 20, 2018.

Between his campaign promises and disdain for Obama’s foreign policy, Trump is not ready to settle for approaches favored by the “adults” in his administration. Tillerson for him was not the right man for the job of devising a Trumpian foreign policy.

President Trump’s dismissal of Rex Tillerson via a Twitter message together with the appointment of Mike Pompeo to head of the State Department has raised many questions about the future course of U.S. foreign policy. So far, the Trump administration has not exactly put its stamp on foreign policy and continued the Obama administration’s policies, perhaps with less micromanagement and more authority to the “generals.” Between his campaign promises and disdain for Obama’s foreign policy, Trump is not ready to settle for approaches favored by the “adults” in his administration. Tillerson for him was not the right man for the job of devising a Trumpian foreign policy.

In the anti-Daesh coalition efforts, the administration allowed CENTCOM to take the lead and continued the policy of allying with “local partners” (YPG) to defeat Daesh, resulting in tensions with NATO ally Turkey. Trump felt forced to continue the Iran deal, which has irritated him deeply as “ripping apart” the deal was a pronounced campaign promise. On North Korea, Trump sought to apply unprecedented pressure to force Kim Jong Un to come to the table through sanctions and with China’s help. These policies were not significantly different when compared with Obama’s, which is seen as having been bothering the president. It seemed like the Tillerson-Mattis duo was “watering down” Trump’s campaign promises and the maximalist positions he favored. Both on North Korea and Iran, Tillerson looked like he was charting a different path that did not exactly reflect the “Trump Doctrine.”

When Trump answered the journalists’ questions on Tillerson’s firing, he particularly emphasized that their differences on Iran was a major reason. Trump has long been unhappy with the nuclear deal as it signifies a major foreign policy accomplishment of Obama’s legacy. Tillerson, along with Secretary of State James Mattis, has opposed the U.S. pulling out of the agreement and Pompeo seems like the right choice to accomplish a renegotiation (which is unlikely) or simply, the U.S. pullout of the deal. Pompeo has been vocal about his critique of the deal and Trump said they shared the same “mindset” when it comes to Iran. Given their long-standing shared criticism of the deal, it has become very likely that the U.S. would end up pulling out of the deal all together.

When it comes to Syria, Pompeo appears to see it as an arena to confront Iran’s influence, yet similarly shows his concerns regarding the Russian support for the Assad regime either. He shares the same belief as Turkey in that the Assad regime is a source of instability and that U.S. interests will not be served as long as he remains in power. Trump in the past has sought to punish Assad for chemical attacks but refused to pursue a regime change in Syria. It is not entirely clear if Pompeo will try to convince Trump about the need to weaken the Assad regime as a way to reduce Iranian and Russian influence in Syria.

Tillerson certainly seemed to understand Turkey’s concerns about the YPG and established a strategic dialogue mechanism to resolve the differences between the U.S. and Turkey. When asked about the issue in an American Enterprise Institute speech, Pompeo referred to the Pentagon’s commendable work in northern Syria but avoided addressing the “complications.” At the same time, there is no reason for Pompeo to prevent the strategic conversation from going forward. All indications are that he would share Tillerson’s willingness to work with Turkey and continue the discussions on the Manbij issue. Unless, of course, the Trumpian “unilateralism” renders forging a common approach with Turkey impossible.

We will most likely see the continuation of several policies particularly in Syria. However, U.S. foreign policy might become more Trumpian with the arrival of Pompeo. Although Pompeo may help bring a more aggressive posture, the American public’s low tolerance for large-scale military interventions might temper this tendency. Trump promised a heavy-handed approach against Daesh but he also championed non-interventionism by attacking the decision to invade Iraq. Trump most probably perceived Pompeo to be the right man to create and implement the Trump doctrine.