This article was first published by The New Turkey on August 28, 2018.

Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

Turkey has been taking direct action in northwestern Syria in order to protect a variety of significant interests for several years now. Since March, Ankara has been working to build camps with a capacity to host 170,000 refugees inside Syria so to stem the refugee inflows in the event of a major operation by the regime against Idlib. The potential for a fresh round of mass exodus is increasing as the Assad regime appears to plan to capture the last remaining bastion of opposition by justifying it on the presence of al-Qaeda linked groups in the area. The Assad regime’s past practice has shown that it will not spare civilians in the event of a military operation and that it will almost certainly create hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Having warned the regime against a possible operation, Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran for a while now to prevent such a scenario.

There may be a real danger of escalation and risk of conflict with Turkish troops on the ground, which have been deployed to the region to create a de-confliction zone – not to mention millions of IDPs, if the Assad regime attacks Idlib. Turkey is now a major stakeholder in what happens in northwestern Syria, including much of Idlib. The region’s future has a bearing on the fate of the opposition supported by Turkey, the success of the de-confliction zones, and whether the Assad regime can make a long-lasting deal with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK. A regime offensive in the area would produce a new era of instability, potentially disturbing the hard-earned stability thanks to Turkey’s investment on the ground and diplomatic work with Russia and Iran.

Turkey has handled the humanitarian situation admirably over the years but this does not mean it was cost-free either economically or politically. Turkey spent billions of dollars in hosting refugees and it has evolved to be a rather politically sensitive issue domestically. The Turkish administration has been advocating for the creation of stable zones in Syria so that significant numbers of refugees are given the possibility of returning to their homelands. It is not clear whether all refugees in Turkey will be able to, or are willing to, return. However, the fact that close to a quarter a million Syrians have returned is already good news for Turkey. Yet, if the regime repeats what it has done in other parts of Syria by inflicting senseless violence and damage in Idlib, Turkey will be hard-pressed to prevent millions from marching to the Turkish border and to protect its other strategic interests.

What happens in Idlib may spell the end of the Syrian Civil War at a catastrophic cost in human lives and humanitarian challenges. The regime clearly intends to declare victory by taking over Idlib even if it has to create yet another major humanitarian disaster. Russia and Iran have been the critical players on the ground with an indecisive American presence focused on Daesh. The U.S.-backed YPG is now striking a deal with the Assad regime, once again refusing to understand the realities of the region and Turkey’s determination. The Trump administration is not interested in a robust strategic presence in Syria despite arguments for it in order to contain Iran’s influence. Lacking a serious rationale for being in northern Syria other than preventing a potential comeback by Daesh, the U.S. commitment will be increasingly weakened.

Given these dynamics, Turkey will remain a major stakeholder in northern Syria and any political agreement for the future of Syria will have to ultimately accommodate Turkish interests. Russia and Iran need to make sure that the situation in Idlib does not result in a disaster that Turkey has to handle on its own. This would not only alienate Turkey as it creates real dangers against Turkish interests but will also delay a potential political deal for Syria.

This article was first published by The New Turkey on August 14, 2018.

President Trump’s domestic agenda has driven the foreign policy agenda while he makes little effort to synthesize the two. In this sense, “America First” has come to mean undermining America’s alliances if it served the administration’s domestic political agenda.

Turkey-U.S. relations are at a new low and it should not come as surprise to anyone that Trumpian foreign policymaking has a lot to do with it. It was less than a month ago that President Trump snubbed most European leaders in a NATO summit in Brussels and seemed to have a warm relationship with President Erdogan, symbolized by the now famous fist bump.

Yet within a month, Trump has given Turkey an ultimatum over the Brunson case, clearly trying to satisfy his Evangelical supporters. As Erdogan refused to bow down to such pressure, Trump announced the doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum that had been imposed earlier this year. Trump was not only impatient with the legal process but also bypassed diplomatic talks between Ankara and Washington, which were designed to resolve the outstanding legal issues between the two countries. As a result, the Turkey-U.S. relationship has become the latest victim of Trumpian foreign policymaking.

This is not the first time that the President has attacked an ally with an eye to retain or increase domestic support on a given issue. Trump attacked Mexico based on his immigration agenda while imposing tariffs on Canada as a result of his economic agenda at home. He threatened to impose tariffs on European imports, which seems to be on hold for the moment after European leaders convinced Trump to work on a new trade agreement.

Trump continues to threaten allies with sanctions for doing business with Iran based on his campaign promise to rip apart the Iran deal, which he did. In all of these instances, President Trump’s domestic agenda has driven the foreign policy agenda while he makes little effort to synthesize the two. In this sense, “America First” has come to mean undermining America’s alliances if it served the administration’s domestic political agenda.

Similarly, President Trump has questioned the very institutions that the U.S. has helped build since the start of the Cold War, including NATO – undermining perhaps the most important institution for U.S. global leadership. Trump’s relentless attacks on NATO were meant to serve his nationalist domestic agenda. The reduction of the debate on NATO’s global role and mission to a budgetary matter, often expressed in terms of financial contributions of member states, was a message to the domestic audience that the U.S. would insist on everybody paying their “fair share.” This message could resonate with a constituency sensitive to government spending and skeptical of the U.S.’ global role. It also sends a message that international organizations are there to serve, first and foremost, U.S. interests rather than sustaining an international system.

Trumpian foreign policy will have long-lasting implications for the global system as well as America’s alliances with countries like Turkey. Turkey is already faced with monumental challenges emanating from the regional instability caused by civil wars in Iraq and Syria. Turkey has also been a strong advocate of international institutions like the UN and NATO assuming larger responsibilities to achieve stability in the region. The U.S., however, chose a unilateralist path under Trump, eroding the effectiveness of multilateral institutions.

Despite these realities, Turkey was working with the U.S. in order to find a resolution to outstanding legal issues between the two countries through diplomatic channels. But the Trump administration’s sanctions and tariffs on Turkey, motivated by domestic political calculations, make it impossible to repair the relationship in the short term.

Trumpian foreign policy will continue to damage U.S. credibility and standing within its allies as well as its competitors. While U.S. allies like Europe and Turkey are going to struggle to effectively address these challenges, they are unlikely to simply roll over. The clear message from the Turkish leadership in the latest currency crisis was that Turkey would not give in to unreasonable demands. Clearly, this is not a desirable state of affairs between two NATO allies, but it is the reality of a new era in which the U.S. government does not hesitate to punish its allies and undermine the very institutions it helped build over decades. Even if the Turkey-U.S. relationship is somehow put back on track, Trumpian foreign policy will continue to introduce much instability into the international system for the foreseeable future.

This article was first published at The New Turkey on August 7, 2018.

Finding a comprehensive solution to the standoff with Iran would remove a significant source of tension from the region but it will probably not be possible in the short and medium terms, barring a major reversal by President Trump or the Iranian regime. In the meantime, both Europe and Turkey will have to figure out a way to work with a unilateralist U.S. administration in order to protect their economic interests as well as energy needs.

The U.S. withdrawal of the Iran nuclear deal and the fresh round of sanctions imposed on Monday present a test to U.S. allies including Europe and Turkey. President Trump campaigned on getting rid of the “worst deal” ever, pulled out of the agreement, imposed sanctions on Iran and promised to isolate the country despite warnings by European allies as well as Turkey. Although President Trump made a rhetorical gesture to Iran’s President Rouhani about meeting face-to-face without preconditions, the U.S. is set to ratchet up the pressure and seek to isolate Iran ahead of the November elections. If anything is clear, Europe is less than thrilled about having to cooperate with the U.S. and states like Russia, China, and India will most likely continue to do business with Iran. Under these conditions, a renewed U.S.-Iran standoff in the coming months might have serious consequences not only for the region but for U.S. allies as well.

European leaders have already expressed their dismay with the Trump administration’s decision to re-impose sanctions underlining that the deal had been working. Furthermore, they are working on providing legislative cover for those businesses adversely affected by U.S. action. The U.S. leadership has been touting Iran’s growing economic problems as part of the success of their pressure campaign but the Iranian regime survived heavy international pressure before. When it finally came to the negotiating table to make the 2015 deal, there was a broad unity among the P5+1 powers and others. The Trump administration’s unilateralist approach will, in all likelihood, be even less effective in isolating Iran and more punishing against U.S. allies.

The Trump administration says it is open to making a more comprehensive deal but declines to take the lead on forging a framework and doing the diplomatic heavy lifting. In the absence of such leadership, Europe will likely limit itself to protecting the financial interests of European companies but will not be able to produce a comprehensive deal. It is doubtful if it can save the Iran deal in any meaningful way. The element of surprise is a signature feature of the Trump presidency as we have seen the President declare his willingness to work toward no trade barriers with the EU. Yet, on Iran, he will most likely pursue a hardline policy until he can declare some sort of “victory.” This dynamic in the wake of November elections makes it almost certain that we will witness increased pressure on Iran and heightened regional tensions.

If the U.S. makes good on its promise to actually start penalizing companies doing business with Iran, Europe, as well as Turkey, will find themselves in a difficult position. Turkey relies on Russia and Iran for most of its energy needs and it cannot easily give up on especially Iranian natural gas. The Obama administration provided Turkey with waivers but doing business with Iran continued to be a significant source of tension in the bilateral relationship. It is not clear whether the White House will be willing to provide exemptions to Turkey but President Erdogan already indicated Turkey’s energy needs as his first priority on this issue. The Trump administration’s unprecedented sanctions on a NATO ally have already severely strained the Turkey-U.S. relationship and additional penalties imposed on Turkish entities for facilitating trade with Iran would deepen the divide, potentially setting the bilateral ties on a course of complete breakdown. Let us hope that the most recent talks between the two sides on the Iran sanctions produce tangible results and that they are not reversed by hasty decisions.

Finding a comprehensive solution to the standoff with Iran would remove a significant source of tension from the region but it will probably not be possible in the short and medium terms, barring a major reversal by President Trump or the Iranian regime. In the meantime, both Europe and Turkey will have to figure out a way to work with a unilateralist U.S. administration in order to protect their economic interests as well as energy needs. The already troubled Turkey-U.S. ties, however, will almost certainly experience the most duress as a result.

This article was first published at The New Turkey on July 30, 2018.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is faced with yet another crisis, this time over the Brunson case. Crises are increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception largely because of the underlying strategic dissonance between the two NATO allies. The U.S. and Turkey continue to fundamentally diverge over the PYD’s position in northern Syria, the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400s, and arms transfers. The legal cases such as the Gulen extradition, the Halkbank case, and the Brunson case further deepen the existing discord. Added to this picture, the Trump administration’s domestic political troubles are pushing the relationship to the brink.

In the latest episode, Vice President Pence’s need to satisfy the demands of his evangelical constituency ahead of the November elections seems to override the need to engage Turkey rather than punish it. Pence’s harsh rhetoric was matched by President Trump’s social media message on the matter, which was clearly coordinated. As with many other foreign policy issues, President Trump used harsh rhetoric despite the welcome progress underlined by high level administration officials such as the Secretary of State Pompeo just days earlier. There is a chance diplomatic channels may produce a result acceptable to both sides on the Brunson case, but the ultimatum-like rhetoric used against Turkey would only make it harder to arrive at a political understanding, if any.

The ongoing efforts in the U.S. Congress to block the transfer of F-35s to Turkey indicates the detrimental effect of domestic political calculations on foreign policy. Congress has asked the Pentagon to provide a report evaluating the implications of Turkey’s potential purchase of Russian S-400s. Lawmakers cited the Brunson case to justify this move but the potential blockade of the transfer of the planes would hurt the very strategic partnership that the F-35 project is supposed to strengthen. President Erdogan has already pointed to international arbitration in case of such a move, which would only cause delays in the program and further damage the U.S.-Turkey security partnership.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship certainly has the capacity to overcome this latest crisis but a lot more effort is required to put it on the right track. Both sides had been avoiding public statements that would damage the ongoing working groups for a while now. But the most recent spat shows that domestic political considerations can be spoilers and it is crucially important to prevent such mishaps. The Turkish public continues to be deeply distrustful of the U.S. and the American public opinion is shaped by negative media coverage as well. Turkish politicians have made a serious effort to work with the Trump administration on all problem areas through various proposals and mechanisms to resolve problems but it is clear they will not respond well to sanction threats. The U.S. leaders need to give time and space to diplomatic channels instead of issuing counterproductive threats.

President Trump’s style of raising the stakes in order to secure a deal that benefits the U.S. seems to be at work here. However, raising the stakes based on domestic political calculations and adopting a maximalist approach cannot provide solutions in an already troubled relationship. The U.S. support for the PYD was already a move that was unilateral in its approach despite assurances provided to Turkey. Now, if the Trump administration goes down the road of unilateralism seeking to force Turkey’s hand, the relationship will only suffer damaging the national interest of both allies. The U.S.-Turkey relationship can hopefully overcome this latest crisis but we will almost certainly see more crises in the future given the instability and unpredictability in the region as well as the increasing insecurity and distrust among NATO allies.

This article was first published at The New Turkey on July 24, 2018.

The U.S. and Turkey can and most likely will work through specific policy issues but the current uncertainties can certainly destabilize the relationship once again. Both sides have a strong interest in avoiding such a scenario and deepening the strategic conversation will be ever more important to overcome potential spoilers.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has always been subject to ups and downs, including the Cold War years. This was one of the themes covered in a conference on the legacy of the July 15 coup attempt organized by SETA DC. The current state of U.S.-Turkey relations is certainly less than ideal, to say the least, but the good news is that both sides are talking to each other. The laundry list of disagreements includes their diverging views on the PYD and FETO, which continue to derail the relationship. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on Iran with a November deadline, we can now add Iran to the list.

On the upside, the most recent Manbij agreement could help bridge the gap between the two sides on the PYD issue. The news of investigations launched against FETO may calm, albeit to a limited extent, the Turkish concerns that Gulenists continue to operate freely in the U.S. against Turkey. On Iran, the most recent U.S. officials’ visit to Turkey might help avoid yet another confrontation between the U.S. and Turkey, similar to the one back in 2010 when Turkey voted against imposing sanctions on Iran as one of the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. However, the most recent Congressional proposal that threatens Turkey’s access to some global financial institutions has put extra strains on the relationship.

In the above-mentioned conference, one overarching approach was that the U.S. and Turkey will be able to work through their disagreements as they have in the past. I subscribed to this idea as well but it does not mean that it will be easy. Turkey, as many other countries, has always found it easier to deal with the Executive branch rather than Congress since certain anti-Turkey lobbying groups have a strong influence on the Hill. The absence of a sufficiently large politically active pro-Turkey Turkish constituency in the U.S. has often been a disadvantage for Turkey’s views to be heard on the Hill. In the current situation, Congressional action driven particularly by the Brunson case is creating risks for the health of the ongoing U.S.-Turkey conversations over a variety of problem areas.

President Erdogan and President Trump seem to get along well and that could be a plus for the relationship. However, we cannot overlook the longstanding disputes coupled with a continuing strategic divergence over the PYD issue, which Turkey considers a national security threat. The Manbij agreement certainly helped to come to a common understanding on the northern Syrian city but it remains uncertain if it can be extended to the areas east of the Euphrates. Furthermore, it is a concern for Turkey that the PYD is seeking to cut a deal with the Assad regime to hedge its bets if the U.S. pulls out eventually. The U.S. has not articulated a clear policy on the PYD or about what it seeks to accomplish in northern Syria in the post-Daesh period.

The Trump administration continues to deal with domestic political problems ahead of the November elections. Much of the administration’s foreign policy approach has been about disruption and policy reversals rather than comprehensive strategies. The most consequential policy change for Turkey’s regional strategy might be the Trump administration’s policy reversal toward Iran, which is currently focused on imposing sanctions and isolating the country.

The U.S.’ relationship with Turkey continues to lack a solid policy framework although it benefits from established institutional ties and more robust engagement recently. The new Iran strategy may spell trouble for the relationship if the U.S. ignores Turkey’s concerns. In the absence of a broad framework for the bilateral relationship, we may end up experiencing a rehash of the 2010 disagreement over Iran, which may undermine limited progress in other areas.

The U.S. and Turkey can and most likely will work through specific policy issues but the current uncertainties can certainly destabilize the relationship once again. Both sides have a strong interest in avoiding such a scenario and deepening the strategic conversation will be ever more important to overcome potential spoilers.

This article was first published by The New Turkey on July 17, 2018.

We will certainly continue to debate the reverberations of the July 15 coup attempt and its legacy for the country. But one overarching message is clear: Turkish people will no longer tolerate their democratic rights and popular will to be undermined and hijacked by cliques and terror groups from within and outside the state.

Within two years since the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey has overcome several monumental challenges. The first and foremost challenge was the coup attempt which was thwarted in its tracks by civilian initiative thus setting the path for future challenges. The coup attempt was undertaken by an illegal organization, FETO, which tried to usurp power from within the state bureaucracy. Members of this organization had systematically infiltrated state institutions for decades while keeping up a façade of merely being a civil society organization.

Turkish people took to streets upon President Erdogan’s call to confront the putschists and protect their democracy. Countless stories from that night have been recounted all illustrating that Turkish people will no longer tolerate anti-democratic forces to dictate their will. It was clear from the onset of the night of the July 15 coup attempt that the era of coups in Turkey was drawing to an end. Unlike previous military interventions, Turkish people’s resistance that night signaled a major turning point in the history of Turkish democracy.

The second challenge was to tackle an unequaled terror organization which had taken over many strategic institutions, subsequently permeating its grip on power through anti-democratic means. Turkey was already dealing with domestic and regional terror organizations like the PKK and DAESH. Confronting FETO, however, demanded a unique approach as this organization existed within the state itself. Turkey had to comb through the state bureaucracy to find out members of a highly secretive organization who received orders from outside rather than from their legitimate superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Especially in the weeks and months immediately following the coup attempt, there was imminent fear of the potential of another coup attempt transpiring any moment. The recent trauma of the night of July 15 was compounded with the urgent need to find out the perpetrators and prevent yet another attempt.

The third challenge was to establish a multi-pronged approach to combat domestic and regional terrorism. Both DAESH and the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were posing immediate security threats especially along the Syrian border. Towns bordering Turkey were often subjected to rocket attacks and occasional destabilizing activities such as smuggling. Lack of stability on the Syrian side of the border created opportunities for the YPG, which was increasingly legitimized and encouraged by western support. Only a month after the coup attempt, Turkey decided to take the fight across the border into Syria both to demonstrate its resolve and to ensure that it would not simply sit by and watch the PKK gain ground. To this end, Turkey conducted the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations in addition to maintaining a military presence in Idlib. Through its military intervention in northern Syria, Turkey’s fight against terrorism evolved from a defensive state to a new proactive approach after the coup attempt by fighting terror organizations across the border when necessary.

The fourth challenge was a political one: to rebuild the political system that suffered from decades of military and civilian tutelage system. The traditional tutelary system prevented the popular will from being fully reflected in the political arena and various state institutions had the ultimate say in state affairs. The AK Party years have challenged this system in a significant way and yet a comprehensive change to the system, which was demanded by people of all segments of the society, had still to be realized. The 2017 referendum on the transition to a presidential system represented the most significant overhaul of the governance system in Turkey. With the June 24 elections, Turkey has now transitioned to a full presidential system whereby the state institutions originally set up to oversee the civilian governments are now going to serve under the elected leaders. It will take time for the new system to be fully functional and there may even be hurdles along the way. Nevertheless, an elected president and an elected parliament are now at the center of the political system with the unelected and appointed civil and military bureaucratic institutions serving under them.

We will certainly continue to debate the reverberations of the July 15 coup attempt and its legacy for the country. But one overarching message is clear: Turkish people will no longer tolerate their democratic rights and popular will to be undermined and hijacked by cliques and terror groups from within and outside the state. This will most likely constitute the cornerstone of the country’s democratic maturity in the years ahead.