This article was first published by The New Turkey on October 10, 2018.
The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns.
The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.
With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.
With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.
Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.
Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.
The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.
The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.
Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.
Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.
This article was first published by The New Turkey on October 2, 2018.
In the years ahead, if it decides to return, U.S. global leadership will find itself in an environment that has fundamentally changed. The emergence of regional cooperation mechanisms and mini-alliances based on a variety of issues will create realities that will not be easy to replace.
There has been a lot of debate about the current U.S. unwillingness to lead the liberal international order it created after World War II. The Obama administration already displayed signs of war weariness, which often translated into no action in conflicts like Syria. On issues that he cared about the most, the Iran nuclear issue and climate change, President Obama worked hard to build international consensus through multilateral institutions in the international system. However, the U.S. was already hesitant to provide leadership on a whole host of issues, particularly in matters of war and peace.
Having run on the theme of “America First,” the Trump administration has transformed this hesitation to what many would call hostility against internationalism and the global institutions themselves. From NATO to NAFTA, military and economic multilateral institutions and agreements have been targeted by President Trump. Traditional allies have been threatened with tariffs and economic pressure unless they agree to deals that would no longer “take advantage” of the U.S. It would be misleading to label this attitude isolationism per se. The Trump administration has been insisting that these international institutions and agreements be made to serve U.S. interests even if it is at the expense of international liberal order.
Just as we saw in the case of the Obama administration’s reluctance to lead, we are now witnessing the Trump administration’s resentment against the international system and that the U.S. is reconsidering its global role. Clearly, both administrations provided no comprehensive answers to the leadership question and both of their approaches have been subject to heavy contestation from both the left and the right domestically. Furthermore, more often than not, the Trump administration’s admonishment of the international system has subsided with rather superficial adjustments (NATO members’ promise to increase their national defense budget to 2%) or renegotiated trade deals (U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement instead of NAFTA). The lesson here is that neither the Obama nor Trump administration has addressed the global leadership question in a comprehensive manner.
The message to the world has been that the U.S. has been rethinking its global role in a rather confused and haphazard manner. At times, the somewhat ideological assertion of national sovereignty seems to take priority whereas, at other times, satisfying some domestic constituency seems to suffice. The response of both the allies (the EU and others) as well as potential rivals (China) have been an interesting one. Nobody seems willing to sit and wait for the U.S. to “come to its senses.”
Allies are thinking of ways to live without the U.S. leadership, recognizing that they may even have to confront the U.S. along the way. The rebuff President Trump received from the UN Security Council a special session on Iran, which was instructive in this sense. Potential competitors like China, on the other hand, are working hard to minimize the economic impact of the impending trade wars by strengthening their regional relationships. In many ways, the world is not waiting for the U.S.
Turkey, as a traditional ally, has had to adjust to the regional realities with minimal or no serious U.S. leadership on a variety of issues including the Syrian crisis. In order to protect its national security and economic interests in the region by minimizing the detrimental impact of the Syrian conflict, Turkey has worked with Russia and Iran on the diplomatic and strategic fronts, the EU on the humanitarian front, and the U.S. on the political front.
The days of alignment with a clearly identified bloc of nations are long gone. Creating a strategy based on the realities on the ground and one that accommodates some of the priorities of the regional powers has become a routine part of policymaking. The most recent rapprochement with Germany can be given as an example of an effort to “bring Europe in” in the absence of robust U.S. leadership.
In the years ahead, if it decides to return, U.S. global leadership will find itself in an environment that has fundamentally changed. The emergence of regional cooperation mechanisms and mini-alliances based on a variety of issues will create realities that will not be easy to replace.
Providing a global framework for action will be ever more difficult since many countries, both allies and rivals, will have pivoted away on a whole host of strategic and economic issues. The U.S. will continue to enjoy great capacity to shape world events, alliances and institutions for the foreseeable future but it will find it increasingly challenging to lead given the legacy of these intervening years with minimal serious U.S. role.
Bu yazı ilk olarak 26 Eylül 2018 tarihinde Kriter‘de yayınlanmıştır.
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Bu hafta New York’ta gerçekleşen Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu (BMGK) toplantılarının, Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri perspektifinden değerlendirildiğinde, birkaç farklı sonucu olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. BM’nin geçmişte küresel sorunlara çare bulmakta en önemli siyasi kurum olarak öne çıkmasında ve işletilmesinde önemli rol alan ABD’nin bu rolünden vazgeçmekte olduğuna şahit oluyoruz. Çin ve Rusya gibi güçlerin de BMGK’yı kendi bölgesel ve küresel çıkarlarını koruma araçlarından biri olarak kullanmak istemeleri dikkat çekiyor. Avrupalı devletlerin ise küresel bir perspektiften yoksun olmaları ve geleneksel olarak bunu ABD’ye havale etmeleri alışkanlığıyla geniş kapsamlı bir politika üretmekten uzak olduklarını görüyoruz. Bu şekilde işlevselliği giderek aşınan BM’nin uluslararası sorunlara çare bulmak bir yana, Filistin meselesinde olduğu gibi çözümü istemeyenlerin politikalarının tek taraflı dayatmalarla meşrulaştırıldığı bir foruma dönüşmesi ‘yeni dünya düzensizliğine’ işaret etmektedir. Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin de küresel düzensizliğin ürettiği istikrarsızlıklardan etkilenmesi kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir.
Uluslararası Sistem Krizi ve Suriye’nin ‘İyi’ Teröristleri
Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde en önemli stratejik kriz alanlarından biri olarak ortaya çıkan PYD/YPG/PKK sorununun büyümesinde BMGK’nın Suriye meselesinde çözümsüzlüğün mimarı haline gelmesinin etkisi büyüktür. Suriye krizinin başlangıcından beri BMGK üyesi Rusya Esed rejimini destekleyerek rejim aleyhinde herhangi anlamlı bir karar alınmasına engel olurken, ABD de genel kurula gerekli ön hazırlık ve pazarlıklarını yapmadığı sembolik karar tasarıları getirmekle yetinmiştir. Amerikan tarafının Suriye’de ulusal çıkarı olmadığı vurgusuyla Rusya’yla ciddi bir siyasi pazarlığa girmeyi reddetmesi, Rus tarafının sorunun devam etmesini sağlayarak bu kozu elinde tutmak isteyen politikalar izlemesine yol açmıştır. BMGK’nın ABD’yle Rusya arasındaki bu ‘dansı’ engelleyecek veya Suriye’de çözümü sağlayacak bir çözüm üretecek zorlayıcı bir mekanizmadan yoksun olması altı çizilmesi gereken bir vakıadır. Diğer bir deyişle, BMGK kararlarının büyük güçlerin siyasi çıkarları etrafında şekillenmesi uluslararası krizlere ve çatışma alanlarına çözüm bulunmasının önündeki en büyük engellerden biri olmuştur. Uluslararası sistem krizinin en önemli tezahürlerinden biri olan Suriye krizinin Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde tamir edilmesi zor bir yaraya neden olması da bu bağlamda değerlendirilmelidir.
ABD’nin PKK’nın Suriye kolu PYD’ye verdiği destek uluslararası toplumun Suriye krizinde bir çözüm üretememesinin bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ancak daha geniş olarak, ABD’nin 11 Eylül sonrası izlediği küresel terörle mücadele politikalarının Irak işgali sonrasında çıkmaza girmesinin ve özellikle Obama döneminde geliştirilen El-Kaide ve DEAŞ gibi terör örgütlerine karşı ‘yerel güçlerle’ çalışma stratejisinin Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine maliyeti büyük olmuştur. Türkiye de dahil olmak üzere birçok Batı ülkesinin teröre karşı koordineli bir şekilde mücadele vermesine rağmen, BM gibi kurumlar uluslararası terörün giderek çetrefilleşen karmaşıklığına karşı siyasi bir yaklaşım ortaya koyamadılar. Yani Irak ve Suriye’de terörü üreten çarpık siyasi koşulları ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik kapsamlı bir strateji üretemeyen uluslararası bir kurum olarak BM özellikle Ortadoğu’yu istikrarsızlaştıran uluslararası terör konusunda ortak bir tavra öncülük edemedi. Terörün ortak tanımının gitgide aşınması büyük güçlerin tek taraflı politikalarıyla bir araya gelince, ABD ve Rusya gibi ülkeler kendi terör ve terörist tanımlarını yapmaya başladılar. Türkiye’nin sıklıkla eleştirdiği ‘iyi teröristi’ ‘kötü teröriste’ karşı kullanmaya kadar varan bu politikaların geliştirilmesinde BMGK’nın büyük güçlerin oyunun kurallarını belirlediği bir mekanizma işlevi görmesinin katkısı büyük olmuştur. Hem Suriye politikası hem de terörle mücadele konularında uluslararası kurumların yetersiz kalmasının ve dolayısıyla yeni dünya düzensizliğinin devam etmesinin Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine maliyeti büyük olmuştur.
Yükselen Popülizm ve Trump’ın Amerikan Ulusalcılığı
Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini son zamanlarda doğrudan etkileyen ve küresel ölçekte BM gibi uluslararası kurumların çözüm bulamadığı sorunlardan biri de yükselen popülizm ve Amerikan ulusalcılığının uluslararası sistemi tehdit eder hale gelmiş olmasıdır. Avrupa’da yükselen popülist milliyetçi dalganın Amerikan versiyonu olarak tanımlanabilecek ‘Önce Amerika’ sloganı, Trump yönetiminin uluslararası kurum ve anlaşmalardan çekilmesiyle kalıcı bir politika haline gelmektedir. Görev başına gelir gelmez Asya-Pasifik Ticaret Anlaşması müzakerelerinden çekilen, Kuzey Amerika Ticaret Anlaşması’ndan (NAFTA) çekilme tehditleri savurduktan sonra Meksika’yla tek taraflı bir ticaret anlaşmasına varan ve NATO gibi en köklü Batı kurumlarına acımasız eleştiriler getiren Trump ulusalcılığı, halihazırda zaten kimlik krizi yaşayan birçok uluslararası kurum ve anlaşmayı önemsiz hale getirmiştir.
Trump liderliğindeki ABD’nin çok taraflı anlaşmalara ve platformlara karşı saldırısı, Türkiye gibi uluslararası sistemdeki rolünü NATO, BM, Avrupa Birliği, G20, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü ve diğer kurumlardaki etkisi üzerinden oynayabilen bölgesel güçlerin bu kurumlara güvenini sarsmaya devam etmektedir. ABD’nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan beri liderliğini yaptığı liberal düzenin kurum ve kurallarına sahip çıkmayıp adeta öksüz bırakması, Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin çok taraflı kurumlar vasıtasıyla ifade edilen boyutlarının da öneminin azalmasına yol açmaktadır. Bunun en önemli örneklerinden biri Trump yönetiminin Brunson davası üzerinden Türkiye’ye karşı uyguladığı siyasi amaçlı ticari yaptırımlar olmuştur. Uluslararası ticaret anlaşmalarının küresel düzenin taşıyıcı rolünün altını oyan tek taraflı yaptırımları git gide daha fazla siyasi bir silah olarak kullanan Amerikan yönetimine karşı uluslararası toplum etkin bir politika geliştirememektedir. ABD’nin çıkarlarını uluslararası norm ve hukukun üzerinde gören Trump ulusalcılığının Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin uluslararası hukuku ilgilendiren boyutlarını görmezden gelmesi ikili ilişkiler için ciddi bir sınama teşkil etmektedir.
Yabancı Düşmanlığı, İslamofobi ve Mülteciler
BM’nin popülist milliyetçiliğin yükselmesiyle birlikte artan yabancı düşmanlığı, İslamofobi ve mülteci karşıtlığı dalgalarına karşı ortak bir tavır üretememesi en önemli fonksiyonlarından birini icra edemediğini göstermektedir. Elbette göçmen karşıtlığının siyasi bir dalga olarak ortaya çıkmasında uluslararası sistemin istikrarsızlığı ve uluslararası terörün etkisi büyüktür ve BM’nin bu dalgayı kendi başına kırması beklenemez. Ancak BM üyesi ülkelerin önünde duran en somut insani meselelerin başında gelen mülteci sorununda küresel bir norm veya politika belirlenmesine yardımcı olamaması uluslararası sistemin durumunun vahametini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yüzyılın en büyük nüfus hareketlerinin müsebbibi olan Suriye krizinde üye ülkelerden yıllık kaynak talebinin ancak yarısına yakınını toplayabilen BM’nin uluslararası bir Marshall planı gerektiren Suriye’de öncülük edememiş olmasının vahim sonuçları olmuştur. Bu nedenle, özellikle mülteci meselesinden en fazla etkilenen ülkelerin başında gelen Türkiye’nin uluslararası sistem eleştirilerini yoğunlaştırması rastlantı değildir.
Başkan Trump’ın iç politikada yabancı düşmanlığı platformu üzerinden siyaset yapması ve mülteci alımlarını minimum seviyeye indirmesi mültecilerin ve sığınmacıların terörle bir arada görünmesine yol açmıştır. Batı’da git gide kabul gören güvenlik merkezli anlayışın hâkim olması, insani bir politika gütmekte ısrar eden Türkiye’yle genel olarak Batı’nın özelde de ABD’nin ilişkilerinde yeni bir sorun alanı doğurmuştur. Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde mülteciler konusunda ortak bir politika oluşturma imkânı doğmadığı gibi İslamofobik ve yabancı karşıtı söylemler ilişkilere zarar vermektedir. ABD’nin Müslüman ülkelere koyduğu seyahat yasağı ve Kudüs’ün başkent olarak tanınması gibi örneklerde olduğu gibi Trump’ın attığı popülist adımlar İslamofobik söylemlerden fazlasıyla nasiplerini almışlardır. Başkan Trump’ın tamamen Netanyahu’yu memnun eden İsrail yanlısı politikalarına karşılık olarak Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın bu konularda yüksek sesle eleştirilerini dile getirmesi ve BM üyelerini özellikle Kudüs konusunda harekete geçirmesi ABD’yle Türkiye arasında Filistin gibi konularda ortak çalışmasının neredeyse imkânsız hale geldiğini göstermektedir.
Uluslararası Sistem ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Geleceği
Irak işgali ve 2008 ekonomik krizinin etkisiyle uluslararası sistemdeki rolünü sorgulayan ABD’nin önümüzdeki dönemde Trump’ın ulusalcı dalgasının etkisiyle küresel liderlik rolünden feragat etmeye devam edeceğini öngörmek pek de zor değil. Uluslararası kurumları ve küresel normları bizzat aşındıran Trump ulusalcılığının global anlamda yeni bir dünya düzeninin kurulmasına katkı yapması neredeyse imkânsız. Bu durumda kısa ve orta vadede ya BMGK üyeleri BM sisteminin köklü reformuna razı olacaklar, ya BMGK üyesi olmayan ülkeler bir araya gelerek alternatif bir oluşum ortaya koyacaklar, ya da uluslararası sistem istikrarsızlık ve düzensizlikle yaşamaya devam edecek. Bu son senaryo en güçlü ihtimal olması itibariyle yeni dünya düzensizliğinin devam edeceğini ve belki de daha da derinleşerek ‘yeni normal’ haline geleceğini söyleyebiliriz.
Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin de hem küresel hem de bölgesel istikrarsızlık ve düzensizlikten ari kalması mümkün değildir. Küresel liderin liderlikten vazgeçmeye niyetli göründüğü bir dönemde bölgesel güçler de kendi aralarında daha dar çerçevede, somut ancak kısa vadeli anlaşmalar yaparak krizleri öteleme yolunu seçeceklerdir. İlerde Amerika’nın ulusalcılığının şiddeti azalıp daha enternasyonalist güçler iktidara gelirse ve ABD küresel liderlik iddiasını yenilemeye kalkarsa işi hiç de kolay olmayacaktır zira o noktada birçok bölgesel güç yeni düzensizliğe uygun politikalar geliştirmiş olacak ve bu liderlik iddiasını belli ölçüde reddedebilecektir. Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin son zamanlarda yaşanan ikili krizler ve liderlik tarzları etrafında açıklanması uluslararası sistemin realitelerini göz ardı etmek anlamına gelir. ABD’nin hem küresel rolüne ilişkin kafa karışıklığını hem de geleneksel müttefiklerine ve liberal dünya düzenine karşı tavır değişikliğini anlamadan Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin geleceğini sağlıklı değerlendirmek de mümkün olmayacaktır.
This article was first published by The New Turkey on September 18, 2018
Turkey’s diplomatic success may have just saved thousands of innocent lives as well as yet another unnecessary humanitarian crisis. However, the Assad regime will certainly seek to take over Idlib eventually. If the Turkish-Russian deal succeeds, the opposition can survive and the contours of a future political deal can be based more on realities on the ground rather than the political goals of the Assad regime.
The Turkish-Russian agreement arrived in Sochi in a meeting between President Erdogan and President Putin comes just in time to avert a major humanitarian crisis. The agreement is to create a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposition and the Assad regime from where heavy weapons would be pulled out. The 10 to 12-mile corridor would be free of al-Qaeda related terror groups under the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the zone would be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces. It is clear that the implementation will be key in determining the ultimate success of the deal but preventing hundreds of thousands from rushing to the north is already a huge relief for Turkey.
The agreement, which will come into effect by October 10, is a diplomatic win for Turkey as well. Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran to prevent the Assad regime from committing more war crimes and creating yet another humanitarian disaster. Through the Astana process, Turkey has worked to deescalate the conflict and to create safe zones. The Assad regime has been using the presence of terror groups like the HTS to justify a major military operation against Idlib, which houses around three million civilians. The Turkish-Russian agreement sends a signal to the regime that it cannot ignore Turkey’s interests and export insecurity to its northern neighbor.
Turkey has adopted a forward leaning military posture since the summer of 2016 to ensure that security threats emanating from Syria no longer threaten the Turkish border towns. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations accomplished this goal to a large extent by pushing the YPG, Daesh, and regime control away from the border. A large-scale military operation by the regime against Idlib would upset the hard-achieved stability in the areas controlled by Turkey and Turkish-supported opposition groups. It would not only weaken Turkey’s ability to manage the humanitarian challenges on the ground but also threaten Turkish border security.
The most difficult part for Turkey will probably be ensuring that the HTS are removed from the buffer zone areas. The continued HTS presence has given the Assad regime an excuse to make a case for attacking Idlib. While it is extremely difficult and unrealistic for Turkey to eliminate HTS completely, the agreement gives Turkey time to force the group’s hardcore elements, which are in fact in the minority, to separate from the more local Syrian fighters and leave the area. This will be critical in removing the Assad regime’s excuse to attack Idlib.
In strategic terms, Idlib is the last bastion of the moderate opposition supported by Turkey. The agreement would require the opposition to pull its heavy weapons out of the buffer zone, which would remove the chance of an imminent clash with the regime forces supported by Russia and Iran. It is not yet clear whether Iran would abide by this agreement but it was already clear that Iranians did not necessarily alienate Turkey at this point. It would be extremely difficult for the regime to launch an offensive on its own without Iran’s help. If the opposition can feel somewhat secure as a result of this agreement, given that Turkish troops will be patrolling the buffer zone, they may be able to focus on other priorities such as providing security and confronting al-Qaeda related groups.
Turkey’s diplomatic success may have just saved thousands of innocent lives as well as yet another unnecessary humanitarian crisis. However, the Assad regime will certainly seek to take over Idlib eventually. If the Turkish-Russian deal succeeds, the opposition can survive and the contours of a future political deal can be based more on realities on the ground rather than the political goals of the Assad regime.
This article was originally published by The New Turkey on September 12, 2018.
With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy.
Turkey has been the most vocal critic of the seemingly impending military assault against Idlib by the Assad regime. Turkey has serious concerns about the strategic and humanitarian consequences of a potential operation. An Assad-Iran ground operation supported by Russian airpower (though limited it may be) can unleash yet another humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees. A regime takeover would signal the end of the opposition as we know it. However, Turkey’s adamant stance combined with its recent military reinforcements to the 12 observation posts might bear fruit and deter the regime, at least for the time being. Given the strong rhetoric used by the U.S. against the Assad regime especially with regard to its potential chemical weapons use, Russia might not be so eager to deploy its air support to the regime any time soon.
The most recent Tehran summit that brought the main sponsors of the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran, demonstrated the level of deep disagreements between these powers. While Ankara has pushed for better relations with Moscow recently, the summit showed that Turkey would stand its ground when it comes to defending its interests in Syria, including the support for the moderate opposition. Turkey has not contended itself with warnings about a possible disaster in Idlib but has taken measures to deter the Assad regime from engineering a fait accompli. Clearly, a regime assault on Idlib goes against the basic logic of the Astana process and it can seriously derail any attempt at a political solution.
The Assad regime and its supporters have shown time and again that they have little interest in a truly political process to end the conflict in Syria. The regime has been trying to “win” through a systematic effort to take over most of the country by implementing strategic ceasefires and military operations both sequentially and simultaneously depending on the region. While there has been the talk of a political process, there has been little tangible progress on that front. Turkey’s military presence on the ground and its continued support to the opposition appear to be the only true obstacles before the regime to accomplish its goals. Turkey, on the other, is trying hard to ensure that when and if the Geneva process happens, it comes to the table with a strong hand and a viable opposition to speak of.
The most recent reports indicate that there has been a quiet policy shift in U.S. policy. Having justified its military operations in the north of Syria on the Daesh threat, the U.S. political and military leaders have not been making a strong case for continued operations in Syria, albeit until recently. The recent shift seems to entail a more open-ended commitment despite President Trump’s earlier comments about leaving Syria soon. Now, the Syria policy appears to be insistent on the departure of Iranian forces from the country as well as a stronger, albeit rhetorical, posture against the Assad regime’s potential Idlib operation. It is difficult to say the U.S. and Turkey see eye-to-eye on Idlib but there are clearly strong overlaps.
A realignment could re-emerge between the U.S. and Turkey’s policies on Idlib, which could give the Assad regime and especially Russia a pause. Despite the diplomatic benefits the U.S. position may provide, Turkey has skin in the game in a way its NATO ally does not. With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy. However, there is every indication that the U.S.’s continued support for the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK, will continue. In fact, much of the new Syria policy might depend on this relationship. If that continues to be the case, the U.S.-Turkey agreement on Idlib may not grow into broader cooperation on Syria.
A key component of the new U.S. policy on Syria will be the focus on reducing Iranian influence in the region, hoping to enlist Turkey’s support. However, with the impending sanctions on Iranian energy sectors, it is safe to bet that the U.S. and Turkey will have serious disagreements on Iran. Turkey vehemently disagrees with Iran on Syria but it is reliant on Iran for its oil and natural gas needs. If the U.S. is interested in enlisting Turkish support against Iran’s regional influence, it will need to engage Turkey in a meaningful way beyond the somewhat limited agreement on Idlib.
This article was first published by The New Turkey on September 5, 2018.
The Syrian Civil War, which has been raging for more than seven years, is entering a new phase, as the Assad regime is threatening to take over Idlib with Russian air support. This may very well be the end of the opposition as we know it since Idlib remains the last opposition stronghold.
The Syrian Civil War, which has been raging for more than seven years, is entering a new phase, as the Assad regime is threatening to take over Idlib with Russian air support. This may very well be the end of the opposition as we know it since Idlib remains the last opposition stronghold. The Assad regime and Russia are making a case about the insertion of extremist elements to the city, conveniently ignoring the millions of IDPs that came to the region following the fall of Aleppo and other areas to the regime. In this phase of the conflict, the regime will seek to take the city at any cost, hoping to declare victory in the ravaged country. Once that happens, Russia will be able to argue that now is the time for the political process to move forward and reconstruction efforts to start. All this will happen at a huge civilian costs.
In many ways, Idlib has become a refuge not only for civilians but for opposition forces that have lacked serious support from outside, except for Turkey. The insertion of al-Qaeda affiliates, such as the HTS, into the region has helped the Assad regime to justify a military operation just like it has done in the rest of Syria. It’s a familiar pattern after all when the regime turns a blind eye to the movement of such groups at the beginning only to use them as justification for further military operations down the road. The international community has largely watched this pattern unfold over and over again, except for when the refugee outflows threatened Europe’s stability. It has not only failed to help the opposition but also delivered a message to the Assad regime that it can create humanitarian catastrophes with little, if any, cost.
With the latest news of Russian air bombardment and the potential operation of regime forces to the city, Turkey is ever more nervous about the humanitarian costs and the possible breakdown of the deconfliction zone it has helped to create. Turkey’s first preference was to work with its NATO ally, the U.S. to empower the opposition for a lasting political deal in Syria. Disillusioned with U.S. policy, however, Turkey has increased its diplomatic efforts toward the two major players on the ground, Russia and Iran, through the Astana and Sochi processes. An important result of significant value for Turkish strategic interests has been the creation of deconfliction zones. Turkey’s intervention to contain the PYD/PKK’s march toward the west was also not opposed by Russia and Iran.
The Assad regime’s impending Idlib operation carries the risk of alienation of Turkey from this diplomatic process, not to mention the potential confrontation between Turkish forces and the regime forces. If the Assad regime conducts an all-out assault on Idlib, Turkey will be hard pressed to protect its interests: maintaining the deconfliction zone, stemming the refugee outflows, containing the PYD/PKK, and continuing to engage with Russia and Iran diplomatically. If the opposition loses its control in Idlib to the regime, there may not be much of a need for a diplomatic process anyway. If and when the regime declares victory, Russia will try to pivot quickly to a debate on reconstruction rather than a political solution. Given the complexities of security and political interests of all political actors, it is difficult to imagine either a meaningful reconstruction effort or a sustainable political agreement will emerge any time soon. Under these conditions, Syria will not be stable for a long time to come regardless of what happens in Idlib.
Kadir Ustun 